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This paper studies the real estate brokerage industry in Greater Boston, an industry with low entry
barriers and substantial turnover. Using a comprehensive dataset of agents and transactions from 1998-2007,
we find that entry does not increase sales probabilities or reduce the time it takes for properties to sell,
decreases the market share of experienced agents, and leads to a reduction in average service quality.
These empirical patterns motivate an econometric model of the dynamic optimizing behavior of agents
that serves as the foundation for simulating counterfactual market structures. A one-half reduction
in the commission rate leads to a 73% increase in the number of houses each agent sells and benefits
consumers by about $2 billion. House price appreciation in the first half of the 2000s accounts for
24% of overall entry and a 31% decline in the number of houses sold by each agent. Low cost programs
that provide information about past agent performance have the potential to increase overall productivity
and generate significant social savings.
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For a large majority of U.S. households, purchasing or selling a home is one of their most important
ﬁnancial decisions. In 2007, two-thirds of households owned their homes, more than a quarter of
national wealth was held in residential real estate, and there were 6.4 million sales of existing
homes.1 The National Association of Realtors (NAR) estimates that almost 80% of residential real
estate transactions involve a realtor. Nationwide, brokers’ sales commissions exceeded $100 billion
annually during the mid-2000s.2 In Greater Boston, the site of our study, more than $4.1 billion
in commissions was paid to realtors in the ten-year period from 1998-2007.
Several distinct features of the brokerage industry have long attracted popular and academic
attention. First, the commissions that realtors charge are sizable, typically representing 5-6% of
a property’s transaction price. A property in our sample sells for $472,000 on average (in 2007
dollars).3 At 5-6% of the sale price, the commission fee constitutes a signiﬁcant transaction cost
for most households, and is more than 40% of Massachusetts’ average median household income in
2006. Second, the commission rate displays little variation over time and across regions, and does
not seem to reﬂect changes in the cost of selling houses. According to a recent federal government
report (GAO 2005), “commission rates within a market do not appear to vary signiﬁcantly on the
basis of the price of a home ... and do not appear to have changed much in response to rapidly
rising home prices in recent years.” These facts have been described in several studies and contrast
with the declining fees of intermediaries in other industries (see, e.g., Hsieh and Moretti (2003) and
Levitt and Syverson (2008a)). With rising housing prices, a ﬁx e dc o m m i s s i o nr a t et r a n s l a t e si n t o
a higher commission fee per transaction and makes working as a broker more lucrative.
The absence of price competition with regards to commission fees is counter-intuitive given
that there are low barriers to enter or exit the brokerage industry. Although all US states require
licensing of brokers and salespersons, these requirements do not appear to present signiﬁcant con-
straints. For instance, when the national average housing price increased by 83% from 1997 to
2006, NAR membership surged from 716,000 to 1,358,000 during the same period. In subsequent
years, house prices fell slightly, but the total number of housing transactions plunged. Many agents
stopped working as realtors and NAR reported a 20% reduction in its membership from 2006 to
2009. Similarly, entry peaked in 2004 in our Greater Boston sample when sales prices were highest,
and dropped by about one-half by 2007 after prices declined.
In this paper, we quantify the social costs of free entry and examine implications of the current
ﬁxed commission structure. Our rich micro-level data set contains all properties in the Multiple
Listing System (MLS) network from January 1998 to December 2007 in all cities and towns within a
15-mile radius of downtown Boston. There are 10,088 agents and 257,923 housing observations, each
with detailed property attributes and transaction information. We are able to exploit cross-market
1Sources for all numbers cited in this section can be found in the data appendix.
2While a real-estate broker usually supervises an agent, often as the owner of the ﬁrm, and is subject to stricter
licensing requirements, we use the terms agent, broker and salesperson interchangeably.
3All dollar values in this paper are in terms of 2007 dollars, deﬂated using the urban CPI (series CUUR0100SA0).
2variation across low and high-income suburbs of Boston and time-series variation from growing
and declining local housing markets. The ﬁrst part of the paper documents that an increase in the
number of agents neither improves the likelihood of sale nor reduces the amount of time required for
properties to sell, but rather results in decreased market share for experienced agents. In addition,
listings by inexperienced agents are 9% less likely to sell than listings by an agent with six or more
years of experience.
Having documented a strong “business stealing” eﬀect, we next formulate an econometric model
to quantify the social costs of free entry, building on existing dynamic discrete choice models
(see, e.g., Aguirregabiria and Nevo (2010)). Entry and exit decisions of agents, together with
their observed commission revenue, allow us to identify the amount of income entrants could have
alternatively earned had they not worked as agents. This foregone income is a measure of ineﬃciency
since agents’ entry mostly dilutes the business of existing agents without increasing the total output
of the brokerage industry. Our estimates imply that agents’ foregone income is about 80% of their
observed revenue.
By micro-founding the model on agent’s choices, we then compute three counterfactuals taking
into account agent re-optimization. First, motivated by FTC’s investigations on rigid commissions,
we present results from regulated across-the-board reductions in the commission rate.4 Reducing
the commission rate by one-half decreases entry by a third, increases the number of houses sold per
agent by 73%, and raises the average sales likelihood by 2%. For our time period, this translates
into $2 billion of savings for consumers and $900 million of savings in opportunity costs and entry
costs from fewer real estate agents.
The second counterfactual measures the alternative market structure if agents are compensated
by their costs of selling properties, a potential outcome with free entry and ﬂexible commissions.
Since these costs are unobserved, we treat the commissions that agents charged in 1998 as a
conservative upper bound. If agents had been compensated by this upper bound, there would
be 24% fewer agents and the number of houses each agent sold would increase by 31%. Total
commissions would be reduced by $1.1 billion, and the social savings from fewer agents would be
$525 million. Alternatively, this counterfactual can be interpreted as measuring how incentives to
work as a realtor change with housing prices. Our estimates imply that only a small fraction of
the beneﬁts from housing price appreciation is passed onto agents because of the business stealing
from entrants. If there were no housing price appreciation during our sample period, the average
commission would be $59,700; by comparison, when housing prices rose 1.5 times during the same
period, the average commission only increased to $63,300.
Finally, a ﬁxed commission rate makes it diﬃcult for consumers to distinguish good agents
from mediocre ones based on the prices that they charge. Our last counterfactual simulates the
4The brokerage industry has been investigated for a number of reasons since at least the 1950s, including the
case U.S. vs National Association of Real Estate Boards in 1950, which ﬁrst prohibited coordination of realtor fees.
Recent FTC and Department of Justice investigations have also examined internet and virtual real estate oﬃces. See
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/realestate/index.htm (last accessed February 2011) for additional information on the FTC’s
investigations of the real estate industry.
3consequence of providing consumers with more information on the past performance of incumbent
agents, a policy with low implementation costs given the records contained in the current MLS.
By empowering consumers with more information, this policy reduces incentives for inexperienced
agents to enter, resulting in an increased number of houses sold per agent and the potential for
signiﬁcant social savings.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides industry background,
describes our data source, and reviews the related literature. Section 3 presents an initial empirical
analysis of the real estate brokerage industry in Greater Boston. Section 4 develops our econometric
model and Section 5 outlines the estimation approach. Section 6 describes our empirical results,
while Section 7 presents the counterfactual analyses. The last section states our conclusions. Jia
and Pathak (2011) (hereafter JP2) provides supplementary material on the sample construction,
computational details, and additional results not reported here.
2 Industry Background and Data
2.1 Industry Background
Real estate agents are licensed experts specializing in real estate transactions. They sell knowledge
about local real estate markets and provide services associated with the purchase and sale of
properties on a commission basis. For home sellers, agents are typically involved in advertising the
house, suggesting listing prices, conducting open houses, and negotiating with buyers. For home
buyers, agents search for houses that match their clients’ preferences, arrange visits to the listings,
and negotiate with sellers. In addition, they sometimes provide suggestions on issues related to
changes in property ownership, such as home inspections, obtaining mortgage loans, and ﬁnding
real estate lawyers.
All U.S. states require real estate brokers and agents to be licensed, but these requirements are
minimal. In Massachusetts, applicants for a salesperson license need to take twenty-four hours of
classroom instruction and pass a written exam. The qualiﬁcations for a broker’s license involve a few
additional requirements: one year of residence in Massachusetts, one year of active association with
a real estate broker, completion of thirty classroom hours of instruction, passing a written exam,
a n dp a y i n gas u r e t yb o n do fﬁve thousand dollars. Agents, or salespersons, can perform most of the
services provided by a broker, except that they cannot sell or buy properties without the consent
of a broker. All licenses need to be renewed biennially, provided the license holder has received six
to twelve hours of continuing education and has paid appropriate fees for renewal (currently, $93
for a salesperson and $127 for a broker). The general perception that these requirements are not
signiﬁcant deterrents to working as realtors is conﬁrmed in our dataset where entrants account for
about 13% of active agents each year.
42.2 Data
The data for this study come from the MLS network for Greater Boston. We collected information
on all listed non-rental residential properties for all towns within a ﬁfteen-mile radius of downtown
Boston, with a total of 18,857 agents and 290,738 observations.5 The list of 31 markets are shown in
Figure 1, where we group together some towns and cities with few agents. The record for each listed
property includes: listing details (the listing date and price, the listing ﬁrm and agent, commissions
oﬀered to the buyer’s agent, and so on), property characteristics, as well as transaction details (the
sale price, date, the purchasing agent and ﬁrm) when a sale occurs. The number of days on the
market is measured by the diﬀerence between the listing date and the date the property is removed
from the MLS database. We merge this data set with a database from the Massachusetts Board of
Registration on agents’ license history which we use to measure their years of experience. Agents’
gender is provided by List Services Corporation, which links names to gender based on historical
census tabulations. We exclude observations with missing cities or missing listing agents.
Information on commissions charged by real-estate agents is diﬃcult to obtain. Even though
our data does not contain commissions paid to listing agents, it does contain commissions paid to
buyer’s agents. Jia and Pathak (2010) report that the buyer’s agent commission is 2.0% or 2.5%
for 85% of listings in the sample. Since we expect this to be a lower bound on commissions paid
to the listing agent, in the analysis to follow, we assume that the total commission rate is 5% in
all markets and years, and is split evenly between the seller’s and buyer’s agent. According to the
2007 NAR survey, most agents are compensated under a revenue sharing arrangement, with the
median agent keeping 60% of his commissions and submitting 40% to his ﬁrm. We subsequently
discuss how this assumption of a 60%-40% split impacts our analysis.
The MLS dataset does not indicate whether working as a broker is an agent’s primary occu-
pation. To eliminate agents who may have brieﬂy obtained access to the MLS system to buy and
sell for themselves, we only keep agents who either work as a buyer’s agent or a listing agent for
more than 1.5 properties per year. This sample restriction leaves us with 10,088 agents listing
257,923 properties, about 90% of the original records. JP2 provides more details on the sample
construction.
Our analysis beneﬁts from three sources of variation present in the data: time-series variation
in the housing market (from an up market to a down market), cross-sectional variation among
agents (from “green” realtors to established agents with decades of experience), and geographical
variation (the median household income of the most aﬄuent town is more than three times higher
than that of the poorest one). Table 1 shows that the number of listings varied from 20,000 to
23,000 in the late 1990s and early 2000s, but increased to 32,500 in 2005. There was a sharp decline
in the number of listed houses in the following years when the housing market suﬀered from the
5To verify MLS’s coverage of transactions in the cities that we study, we compared it to the Warren Group’s
changes-of-ownership ﬁle based on town deeds records, which we have access to from 1999-2004. This dataset is a
comprehensive recording of all changes in property ownership in Massachusetts. The coverage was above 70% for all
cities except Boston, which was around 50%. This fact, together with concerns about data quality in Boston, lead
us to exclude the city of Boston from the empirical analysis.
5decline in the aggregate economy. The weakness of the housing market in the latter part of the
sample is apparent in the fraction of properties sold: before 2005, 75-80% of listed properties were
sold; in 2007, only 50% were sold. The third column of Table 1 shows that average sales price was
about $350,900 (in 2007 real dollars) in 1998 and peaked at $529,200 in 2005. It dropped slightly
to $489,800 - $502,400 in 2006 and 2007. The amount of time it takes for properties to sell appears
to lead the trend in sales prices: it sharply increases in 2005, and by the end of the sample a listed
property requires about two months longer to sell than in 1998.
2.3 Related Literature
This paper is related to research on real estate brokers and their impact on the housing market. An
important precursor to our work is Hsieh and Moretti (2003) which presents evidence consistent
with socially ineﬃcient numbers of real estate agents. Using variation across 282 metropolitan
areas from the 1980 and 1990 Census of Population and Housing, they document that the average
earnings of real estate agents are similar despite large diﬀerences in housing prices, suggesting
that agent entry dilutes rents associated with house price diﬀerences under ﬁxed commissions.
Moreover, agents in cities with high housing prices have lower productivity (measured by houses
sold per agent) compared to agents in cities with low housing prices. Using the more recent ﬁve
percent sample of the 2000 Census of Population and Housing, Han and Hong (2011) examine
agents’ variable costs of selling houses in a static entry model. Their estimates suggest that free
entry leads to a loss of economies of scale: a 10% increase in the number of realtors increases the
average variable cost of selling houses by 4.8%. Due to data limitations, they assume all agents are
identical and ignore the opportunity cost of entry.
Further aﬁeld, there are a number of related papers on real estate agents. Kadiyali, Prince, and
Simon (2009) study dual agency issues in real-estate transactions. Levitt and Syverson (2008b)
compare home sales by agents who own the property to home sales by agents hired to sell the
property. Hendel, Nevo, and Ortalo-Magné (2009) contrast traditional multiple-listing services
with for-sale-by-owner platforms. Jia and Pathak (2010) study the impact of buyer’s commissions
on home sales.
Aside from real-estate brokers, another paper which investigates the impact of free-entry is
Berry and Waldfogel (1999)’s study of the radio industry. Their paper is based on cross-sectional
data on the number of stations, radio listening, and advertising prices. More recent contributions
build dynamic econometric models of entry in imperfectly competitive industries (e.g., Collard-
Wexler (2008), Dunne, Klimek, Roberts, and Xu (2009), Ryan (2010), and Xu (2008).) While
sharing a methodological approach with these papers, our paper diﬀers from these studies on several
dimensions. To capture the main features of the housing market while still allowing estimation to be
feasible, we work with a model with six state variables. Rather than following the common approach
of discretizing the state space, we treat it as continuous, approximate the value function using basis
functions, and cast the Bellman equation as model constraints. We adopt a similar procedure in the
counterfactual simulations. Our estimator falls into the class of estimators studied by Ai and Chen
6(2003) and Chen and Pouzo (2009). Bajari, Chernozhukov, Hong, and Nekipelov (2009) provide
identiﬁcation results for dynamic games that apply to our application. In an independent study,
Kristensen and Schjerning (2011) show that maximum likelihood estimation of dynamic models
with value functions being approximated by basis functions has desirable properties.
Finally, our paper is related to an extensive literature on dynamic models of occupational
choice and job matching (see e.g., Keane and Wolpin (2009) for a recent survey). Related to our
econometric approach, Keane and Wolpin (1994) develop a ﬁnite-period dynamic model and use
backward induction to estimate the value function. In each step, they solve the value function for
a subset of state points, and extrapolate to all other state points.6 Our method may be applicable
in similar problems with the advantage that it avoids discretization and is computationally much
less demanding.
3 Initial empirical analysis
3.1 Descriptive statistics
Greater Boston’s housing market exhibits signiﬁcant time-series variation in the number of prop-
erties listed, the likelihood of sale, and sales prices over our sample period. Total volume of home
sales increased from 18,094 in 1999 to 21,432 in 2004, an increase of 18%. It subsequently de-
creased to 76% of the 1999 level within three years. The average real sales price of homes went
from $385,900 in 1999 to $529,200 in 2004, down to $489,800 in 2007. Since the expected revenue
of an agent depends on each of these factors, it is unsurprising that agent entry and exit follow
these market-wide trends. Table 2A shows that the number of active agents increased from around
3,800 in 1998 to a peak of more than 5,700 in 2005, just as house price appreciated during the same
period. The number of agents who left the industry was around 400-500 during the early period,
but rose to 700-800 in the latter part of our sample, when housing market conditions deteriorated
and the fraction of listed properties that were sold dropped.
Agent performance is also related to overall trends in the housing market. During the run-up in
prices in the early part of the 2000s, the number of properties each agent intermediated was about
eight per year. By 2007, the average agent conducted a little more than ﬁve transactions. The
distribution of agents’ transactions is highly skewed: both the number of listings sold per agent and
the number of houses bought per agent at the 75th percentile is four to six times that of the 25th
percentile. During the down markets of 2006 and 2007, a signiﬁcant fraction of real estate agents
were hit hard: more than 25% of the listing agents did not sell any properties at all.
Home sales, agent entry and exit, and agent performance also vary across markets within Greater
Boston, as shown in Table 2B. The most expensive town in our sample is Wellesley, where the
average house sold for more than $1 million. On the other end, in Randolph, the average sold
price is $290,000. Quincy, a town with over 10,000 housing transactions, has signiﬁcant turnover:
6For a few other examples (including discussions) of value function approximation, see Ericson and Pakes (1995),
Judd (1998), Farias, Saure, and Weintraub (2010), and Fowlie, Reguant, and Ryan (2011).
7it is home to the most entries and has the second largest number of exits. Cambridge has about
the same number of properties, but there are considerably fewer agents and much less turnover.
This translates into a higher number of properties sold and bought per agent in Cambridge than
in Quincy: 10.46 versus 7.27. In general, agents in higher-priced towns are involved in fewer
transactions, and the correlation coeﬃcient between the average housing price and the number of
transaction per agent is around -0.43 across all markets.
An important component of performance diﬀerences between agents is their experience. Panel
A of Table 3 reports the average annual commissions of agents based on the number of years they
worked as a broker. The category of nine or more years of experience has 19,210 observations with a
total of 3,146 agents. These agents were active at the beginning of our sample. All other categories
(one to eight years of experience) are mostly comprised of brokers who entered during our sample
period. Agents who have worked for one year earn $20,000 on average. They sell about 61% of
their listed houses and generate a larger share of their income from working as a buyer’s agent.
In contrast, agents with the most experience are 13% more likely to sell their listed properties,
earn about $73,000 in commissions, and earn more of their commission income working as a seller’s
agent than as a buyer’s agent. There is a clear monotonic pattern between measures of agent
experience, sales probabilities, and commissions. Finally, more experienced agents appear to sell
faster, although the diﬀerence in days on market is modest.
Performance diﬀerences are also closely related to agent skill, which we measure by the number
of transactions they brokered in the previous year. Panel B of Table 3 reports sales probabilities,
days on the market, and commissions by deciles of agent skill. Since this measure is highly correlated
with years of experience, Panel B displays similar patterns as Panel A. Agents in top deciles have
higher sales probabilities, earn higher commissions, and a larger portion of their income comes from
the selling side.
Next we examine agents’ performance over time. We assign agents who were present in 1998 (the
1998 cohort) into four groups based on their 1998 commissions, and plot their annual commissions
from 1999 to 2007 in Figure 2. Results using other cohorts are similar. The top quartile agents
consistently earned $100,000 or more for most of the years, while the bottom quartile barely earned
$30,000 in commissions even when housing prices were at their peak. Moreover, agents in the top
quartile earn signiﬁcantly more than those in the 2nd or 3rd quartile. The earning gap between the
2nd and the 3rd quartile agents is much smaller and also compresses in down markets.
Earning diﬀerences also inﬂuence an agent’s decision on whether to work as a broker. Figure 3
follows the same 1998 cohort and reports the fraction of agents who continue working as a broker for
each quartile in each year. There are stark diﬀerences in the exit rates among the four groups. Only
25% of the top quartile agents left by 2007. In contrast, about three quarters of the agents in the
bottom quartile exited at some point during the ten-year period. Figure 3 presents our identiﬁcation
argument in a nutshell: diﬀerences in the exit rate of agents earning diﬀerent commissions allow us
to identify their opportunity cost of being a broker.
83.2 Descriptive regressions
We next investigate how competition aﬀects agent performance. The correlations we document here
inform the modeling choices we make in the next section. In the regressions below, we measure the
extent of competition by the number of competing real estate agents who work in the same market
and year.
We report estimates of agent performance, , for agent  working in market  in year  from
the following equation:
 =  +  +  + log()+ (1)
where  is one of two measures of performance: commissions and the number of transactions.
 and  are market and year ﬁxed eﬀects.  is agent skill, proxied by the number of properties
agent  intermediated the previous year following Table 3B.7 The parameter of central interest is 
the coeﬃcient of the competition measure, which reveals the impact of an increase in the number
of competing agents on agent ’s performance, adjusting for his skill.
We estimate equation (1) for a ﬁxed cohort, deﬁned as the set of agents who are active or have
entered as of a given initial year. This formulation avoids changes in the composition of agents,
which would confound our results. For instance, the 1998 cohort analysis includes all agents active in
1998. Agents who entered in subsequent years are excluded from the regression, but they contribute
to the competition variable log().8 Table 4A reports estimates of  for the ﬁrst seven cohorts
(the 1998- to the 2004- cohort). Estimates for later cohorts 2005-2007 are much less precise as
sample sizes drop. To allow for diﬀerential competition eﬀects for established agents and others,
we assign each agent in a cohort to four groups according to his commission in the initial cohort
year, and estimate equation (1) separately for each group. Results of the commission regression
and the number-of-transaction regression are reported in columns (1)-(5) and columns (6)-(10) of
Table 4A, respectively.
Since agent entry is cyclical and our competition measure increases during a booming market,
we anticipate that our estimates are biased downward. Despite this, the  estimates are signiﬁcantly
negative and sizable for almost all regressions we estimated, implying that incumbent agents receive
lower commissions and conduct fewer transactions when competition intensiﬁes. For example, a 10%
increase in the level of competition is associated with a 1.1%-6.7% decrease in average commissions
and a 2.5-7.3% reduction in the number of transactions, with the largest impact born by the
2004 cohort. Across agent quartiles, the estimates tend to be larger for the 2nd and 3rd quartiles,
implying that competitors steal more business from middle-tier agents, and have a smaller impact
on superstar agents.9
Having documented a strong business stealing eﬀect, we now examine whether home sellers
7We also estimated models using the number of years worked as a broker and found similar estimates.
8Changes in the composition of cohorts do arise when agents exit. We also estimated equation (1) on the subset
of agents who are active in all years (a balanced panel). These estimates produce larger estimates of the negative
impacts of competition, although the diﬀerences are not signiﬁcant.
9The coeﬃcients for the bottom quartile agents are less precise since many have zero or one transaction in any
given year.
9beneﬁt from more competition among agents. Let  be a measure of the sales experience (the
likelihood of sale, days on the market, or sales price) of a home intermediated by agent  who works
in market  in year . We estimate a property level regression of the following form:
 =  +  +  + 0 + log()+ (2)
where  ,  and  are deﬁn e da si ne q u a t i o n( 1 ) .  represents a vector of property
attributes including zip code ﬁxed eﬀects, the number of bedrooms, bathrooms, and other rooms,
the number of garages, age, square footage, lot size, architectural style, whether it has a garden,
type of heating, whether it is a condominium, a single family or a multi-family dwelling, and
sometimes the list price. We report estimates of  in Table 4B.
When the number of competing agents in a market increases, the likelihood that a property
sells decreases, even though more agents are typically associated with a booming market. The
point estimate in column (1) implies that a 10% increase in the number of agents is associated
with nearly a 1% reduction in the sales probability, whose sample average is 69%. It is possible
that when there are more agents, sellers are more likely to list their property at a higher price
to ‘ﬁsh’ for a buyer. We add list price in column (2) to control for seller’s preference. With this
adjustment, the negative impact reduces to 0.6%, but still signiﬁcant. Another possible explanation
is that the composition of properties changes with the market condition: houses that are harder to
sell (due to unobserved attributes) are more likely to be listed in a booming market. To examine
this possibility, we interact the competition measure with indicators for before or after 2005 in
column (3). The estimates for both periods remain negative, suggesting that the negative impact
of competition is not solely driven by unobserved changes in the composition of properties listed
in an up market.
The impact of more agents on days on the market is negative, but insigniﬁcant. It is possible
that variation in days on the market are mostly driven by market-wide conditions, captured by
market and year ﬁxed eﬀects in equation (2). Competition does seem to be associated with an
i n c r e a s ei nt h es a l e sp r i c eo fap r o p e r t y ,b u tt h ei m p a c ti sm o d e s tw h e nw ec o n t r o lf o rt h el i s t
price, as documented in columns (8) and (9). A 10% increase in competition generates a 014%
increase in the sales price, which translates to about $600 for a typical home. The estimate is
similar when we allow for diﬀerential competition eﬀects before and after 2005. Since a higher sales
price is a transfer from buyers to sellers and has a negligible impact on aggregate consumer surplus,
in subsequent sections we do not focus on the impact agents have on sales prices. In summary,
results from estimates of equation (2) suggest that the beneﬁt home sellers receive from more agent
competition is limited at best.
4 Econometric Model
The patterns in the previous section show that there is a strong business stealing eﬀect and that
competition from more agents does not improve agents’ quality of service as measured by sales
10likelihood and time to sale. In this section, we incorporate competition among agents in modeling
their entry and exit decisions. These decisions, together with observed commission revenue, allow
us to estimate their opportunity cost of being a broker. We ﬁrst describe various elements of
the model: the state variables, the revenue (or payoﬀ) function, and the transition process of
s t a t ev a r i a b l e s . T h e nw ep r e s e n tt h eB e l l m a ne q uation and the value function and discuss some
limitations of the model.
4.1 State variables
To model the evolution of the housing market and how it aﬀects the entry and exit decisions of
agents, we need to represent the housing market in terms of state variables. Since our data includes
information on the attributes of each property that an agent intermediates, in principle, we could
model how agents are matched to particular properties, and how this would impact their commission
revenue. We do not pursue this rich representation and instead work with a more stylized version
of the housing market.
There are two main reasons for this simpliﬁcation. First, including property-speciﬁcf e a t u r e s
in the state space substantially increases its dimension. A large number of payoﬀ relevant state
variables in dynamic models is challenging for estimation and in counterfactual analyses that involve
solving for a new equilibrium. In particular, it is diﬃcult to estimate the joint transition process
of many state variables and compute a high-dimensional integral of an unknown value function.
Second, even if it were possible to surmount these computational and estimation hurdles, our data
do not include information on the characteristics of home sellers and buyers, making it formidable
to model the matching process between households and agents without ad hoc assumptions. As
a result, we choose a parsimonious representation of the housing market that still allows for a
reasonable ﬁt of the main moments of the data.
We assume that agents’ commissions are determined by two sets of (payoﬀ-relevant) variables:
aggregate variables and their individual characteristics. The aggregate variables are the total
number of houses listed on the market, the average housing price, the ratio of inventory over the
number of properties sold in the previous year, and the number of competing agents. The total
number of listed houses  counts all houses for sale as of the ﬁrst day of year  together with all
new listings throughout the year in market . The average house price  is the equal-weighted
price of all houses that are sold in market  in year . To construct the inventory-sales ratio, at the
beginning of each month, we take the ratio of the number of listed properties in inventory (which
includes new listings and unsold properties) and the number of properties sold in the previous year.
Next, we average over 12 months to compute the inventory-sales ratio in year , denoted by .
This ratio is included as a proxy for market tightness, considered an important factor by the NAR
who publishes a similar Market Tightness Index. In our application, this ratio is an important
predictor of whether a listed property is sold and the amount of time it takes to sell.
Individual characteristics include an agent’s gender, ﬁrm aﬃliation, the number of years they
have worked as a broker, and a count of their past transactions. We assume that the ﬁrst three
11aggregate state variables describing the housing market — the number of houses for sale, the average
price of houses, and the inventory-sales ratio — transition exogenously. That is, we abstract away
from potential feedback between agent entry and the aggregate housing market state variables since
it seems unlikely that this accounts for a signiﬁcant fraction of market-level variation.
4.2 Revenue function
Realtors earn commissions either from sales (as listing agents) or purchases (as buyer’s agents) of
homes. We model these two components of agent revenue separately.
Agent ’s commissions from sales depends on his share of houses listed for sale and the probability
that these listings are sold within the contract period. Since the aggregate variables are the same
for all agents in market  and year , the listing share only depends on individual and rival
characteristics (we omit the market subscript  throughout this section). The following listing












 include agent ’s demographics, work experience, ﬁrm aﬃliation, and proxies
for agent skill. The variable 
 represents his unobserved quality (observed by all agents, but
unobserved by the econometrician), much like unobserved quality variables in Berry, Levinsohn,
and Pakes (1995) and other discrete choice models. We report estimates assuming that 
 is
independent across periods. In Section 6.1, we present evidence that correlated unobserved state
variables may not be important once we include our proxy for agent skill. This assumption is also
needed because of computational diﬃculties of incorporating correlated state variables in dynamic
discrete choice models.





 + ) (4)
is sometimes called the “inclusive value” (see, e.g., Aguirregabiria and Nevo (2010)). It measures the
level of competition agents face in obtaining listings. Rather than tracking all rivals’ decisions, they
behave optimally against the aggregate competition intensity  This approximation of competition
can be motivated by the large number of agents per market.
Agents only receive commissions when listings are sold. The probability that agent ’s listings








 includes measures of aggregate housing market conditions (total number of houses listed,
the inventory-sales ratio, etc.), as well as his own characteristics. Since we treat the sales price as
12exogenous, this formulation does not allow for a trade-oﬀ between the probability of sale and the
sales price. An agent’s total commission from selling listed houses is:

 =  ∗  ∗  ∗  ∗ Pr(sell)
where  is the commission rate,  is the aggregate number of houses listed, and  is the average
price index.
We develop the model for an agent’s commissions from representing buyers in a similar way:


 =  ∗ 
 ∗  ∗ 
where 
 is the total number of houses bought by all home buyers,  is the same as before, and












 are his observed and unobserved characteristics, respectively. Similar to the







To reduce the number of state variables, we make the simplifying assumption that 
 =0 69
where 069 is the average probability that houses are sold. In our sample the correlation between

 and  is 0.94, so this simpliﬁcation allows us to reduce the state space. Since an agent’s
revenue depends on  ∗ , we group these two variables together as , a single state variable
that measures the aggregate size (in dollars) of a housing market.
Finally, agents earn commissions as both buyer’s and seller’s agents. As a result, agent ’s
earnings at any given set of payoﬀ-relevant state variables  = {


     }
is:
()=()+()
=0 015 ∗  ∗ ( ∗ Pr
 + ∗ 069)
Despite this stylized representation of the housing market, the correlation between the model’s
predicted revenue and the observed revenue is 0.70. The model also captures well the upward and
downward trend of observed revenues. We provide details on the model’s ﬁtness in Section 6.4.
4.3 Transition process of state variables
When agents consider entry and exit, they factor in both their current revenue and their future
prospects as realtors, which are determined by the exogenous state variables as well as rival agents’
13entry and exit decisions. Table 2A shows that entry nearly doubled in 2005 and then dropped
substantially afterward. We do not explicitly model agent’s beliefs on how the aggregate state
variables evolve. Instead, we adopt a standard AR(1) model with trend breaks before and after
2005, when house prices peaked in our sample.
The aggregate state variables are assumed to evolve according to the following equation:
+1 = 0 ∗ 1[2005] + 1 ∗ 1[ ≥ 2005] + 2 ∗  +  +  (6)
where 0 and 1 are coeﬃcients of the trend break dummies, 1{·} are indicator functions, 2 is a
matrix of autoregressive coeﬃcients,  is the market ﬁxed eﬀect, and  is a mean-zero multi-
variate normal random variable. Market ﬁxed eﬀects in equation (6) are included to control for
size diﬀerences across markets: the largest 5 markets have twice as many listings as the smallest
5 markets. In JP2, we show that omitting market ﬁxed eﬀects leads to biased estimates for the
autoregressive coeﬃcients.
We also investigated splitting the sample at year 2005 and estimating a separate transition
process for each sub-sample without much success. The 2 for the second part of the sample is
very low, since we have only a few periods per market after 2005. An alternative to the structural
break is to add multiple lags and high-order polynomials. We prefer equation (6) given that its 2
is high (ranging from 0.77 to 0.96) and that our panel is relatively short. An agent’s skill is also
modeled as an AR(1) process, including the trend break as above.
4.4 Entry and exit decisions
In the econometric model, agents can make career adjustments each period: some incumbent agents
continue to work as realtors, others leave it (exit), and new agents become brokers (entry). At the
beginning of a period, agents observe the exogenous state variables, their own characteristics,
as well as two endogenous variables −1 and −1 at the end of the previous period.  and
 are measures of the competition intensity and are determined by all agents’ entry and exit
decisions jointly: they increase when more people become realtors and decrease when realtors quit
and seek alternative careers. Agents also observe their private idiosyncratic income shocks and
simultaneously make entry and exit decisions.
Since agents can start earning income as soon as they ﬁnd clients, we assume that there is no
time lag between entry (becoming an agent) and earning commissions. This assumption contrasts
with the literature on the dynamic entry and exit decisions of ﬁrms, which assume that ﬁrms pay
an entry cost at period  and start generating revenues in period +1after a one-period delay due
to installing capital and building plants (see, e.g., Ericson and Pakes (1995)).
Let  denote exogenous state variables and individual characteristics and  denote endogenous
state variables  and . The Bellman equation for an active agent  is:
˜  ( −1)=˜  max
(
 [( )| −1] −  +˜ 1 + ˜  (+1 | −1)
˜ 0
(7)
14where  [( )| −1] is his expected commission revenue conditional on observed state
variables. Conditioning on state variables, the revenue function also depends on 
 and 
 which
we integrate out using their empirical distributions.10 Since income shocks are private, agent  does
not observe  that is determined by all rivals’ entry and exit at period . Instead, he forms an
expectation of his commission revenue for the coming period if he continues working as a broker.
The variable  captures agent ’s costs of brokering house transactions. It includes his foregone
labor income from working in an alternative profession, as well as the per-period ﬁxed cost of being
an agent due to the expense of renting oﬃce space, the cost of maintaining an active license, and
resources devoted to building and sustaining a customer network. We assume that the cost of being
a broker does not depend on the number of houses he handles, because the marginal monetary cost
of listing more properties is likely swamped by the ﬁxed costs. We report counterfactual results
under diﬀerent assumptions on marginal cost as a robustness check. In all speciﬁcations we consider,
 diﬀers across markets, but is the same for agents within a market. In the main speciﬁcation,  is
ﬁxed throughout the sample period, but we also present results allowing it to vary over time.
The econometric model treats “exit” as a terminating action. Re-entering agents account for
about 9% of our sample. Relaxing this assumption would require estimating two value functions
and substantially increase the complexity of the model.11
Private shocks ˜ 0 and ˜ 1 are assumed to be i.i.d. extreme value random variables with standard
deviation 1
1 where 1  0. Denoting the expected commission revenue  [( )| −1] as
¯ ( −1), and multiplying both sides of equation (7) by 1, the original Bellman equation can
be rewritten as:
 ( −1)= max
(
1 ¯ ( −1) − 1 + 1 + (+1 | −1)
0
where  ( −1)=1˜  ( −1) and  = 1˜  for  =0 1 Given the distributional
assumptions on  the Bellman equation is simpliﬁed to the usual log-sum form:
 ( −1)=l o g
£
1+e x p
¡ ¯ ( −1)+(+1 | −1)
¢¤

where we have replaced 1 ¯ ( −1)−1 with ¯ ( −1) to keep the notation simple. The
main focus of the empirical exercise is estimating  = {12} with 2 = −1.
The probability that incumbent agent  is active at the end of period  is:
Pr(stay| −1)=
exp
¡ ¯ ( −1)+(+1 | −1)
¢
1+e x p
¡ ¯ ( −1)+(+1 | −1)
¢ (8)
10We ignore the dependence of  and  on , which we suspect is negligible given the large number of agents
included in  and 
11The estimation strategy would be similar, except that we need to use the exit choice probability to recast one of
the choice-speciﬁc value functions as a ﬁxed point of a Bellman equation following Bajari, Chernozhukov, Hong, and
Nekipelov (2009).





1[ =0 ]∗log[1 − Pr(stay|)]+
X

1[ =1 ]∗log[Pr(stay|)] (9)
P r o v i d e dw ea r ea b l et os o l v ef o r and calculate the choice probability Pr(stay|) we can
estimate  by maximizing equation (9).
Potential entrants must pay a fee (entry cost) to become a broker. They enter if the net present
value of being an agent is greater than the entry cost  (up to some random shock). The Bellman
equation for potential entrant  is:
 ( −1)= max
(






− + ¯ ( −1)+(+1 | −1)
¢¤









− + ¯ ( −1)+(+1 | −1)
¢
Let  =1be an indicator that potential entrant  enters at . The log likelihood of observing





1[ =1 ] ∗log[Pr(entry|)]+
X
≤ ¯ 
1[ =0 ] ∗log[1−Pr(entry|)] (10)
Since the entry cost estimate ˆ  is sensitive to the assumption of the maximum number of potential
entrants ¯  we estimate equation (10) separately from the main model (9). We report estimates
of entry costs under three diﬀerent assumptions on ¯ .
4.5 Discussion on modeling assumptions
The main structural parameter of interest is , the average agent’s total costs of brokering trans-
actions. The current formulation of the model does not allow  to depend on state variables. This
is constrained by the fact that we only observe one action for each active agent (stay or exit) and
cannot separately identify the impact of a state variable working through  versus its impact work-
ing through revenue  on agent actions. Likewise, we cannot allow for a variable cost component
in  (which depends on the number of transactions) because agent revenue is proportional to his
total number of transactions. However, the model does allow  to vary across markets, as might be
expected if outside opportunities are related to market conditions.
Some real estate brokers work part time. According to NAR (2007), 79% of realtors report
that real estate brokerage is their only source of income. For the other 21% of agents holding more
16than one job, we do not observe their income from other sources. However, our estimate ˆ  is the
relevant measure of agents’ time devoted to working as brokers. Suppose an agent has two jobs,
earning $35,000 as a broker and $10,000 from a second job. If we observe him exit after earning
$30,000, then his opportunity cost of working as a broker is between $30,000 and $35,000 (ignoring
the optional value of future earnings), even though the value of his total working time is higher.
Having part-time agents reduces ˆ , but this correctly measures the average value of time that agents
devoted to being a broker. We attempted to formally address part-time agents using a discrete
mixture model that allows two types of agents with diﬀerent opportunity costs, but the likelihood
was ﬂat in a large region of parameter values.
Two other features of the model are also due to data constraints that we do not observe all
aspects of the interaction between home-sellers, agents, and the housing market. First, the model is
silent on possible unobserved beneﬁts that consumers derive from competition among realtors. For
instance, we do not measure gifts that agents give away in marketing their services. In addition,
when there is enhanced competition from entry, agents might work harder to satisfy requests from
their clients and provide better services. The results in Section 3 suggest that these possibilities did
not translate into gains for sellers on the likelihood of sale and days on the market. It is possible,
however, that buyers beneﬁtf r o mt h ev a r i e t ya ﬀorded by a large pool of agents. If this is an
important source of consumer surplus, then our counterfactual results miss the losses to consumers
with fewer agents.
Second, since we do not observe the actual contract terms between agents and their ﬁrms, we
assume that agents keep 60% of total commissions, based on the 2007 national survey conducted
by NAR. This assumption aﬀects our estimate proportionately: if the average commission is under-
estimated by %,t h e n1 will be over-estimated by the same amount. As a result, the opportunity
cost  = −
2
1 will be under-estimated by %.
5 Solution Method
As explained above, the unknown value function  (·) is implicitly deﬁned by a functional Bellman
equation. The ability to quickly compute the value function is a crucial factor in most empirical
dynamic models and in many cases is a determining factor in model speciﬁcation. In this section,
we describe our solution algorithm. JP2 contains additional computational details and Monte-Carlo
results. To simplify notation, we omit subscripts throughout this section, and use  to denote the
vector of state variables.
5.1 Diﬃculties with existing approaches
We began our analysis with the traditional approach of discretizing the state space, but met with
substantial memory and computational diﬃculties when we tested our model with four state vari-
ables. One of the challenges involves calculating the future value, (0|), a high-dimensional
integral of an unknown function. The quadrature rules require evaluating the value function  ()
17at quadrature points that do not overlap with grid points. Since  () is unknown at any point
outside grids, we need to interpolate  () from grid points to quadrature points. With four state
variables and ten grids each, more than 95% of our computing time was spent on interpolation.
As a result, solving the value function using the Bellman iteration  ()=Γ(( −1(0|))
for a given parameter value was slow and often took a couple of hours. Moreover, the memory
requirements of discretization increases exponentially.12
Another factor that discouraged us from discretization is that there are far fewer data points
than the size of the state space when the number of state variables is large. Discretizing the state
space and solving the value function for the entire state space implies that most of the time in
estimation is spent solving value function  () for states that are never observed in the data
(and hence not directly used in the estimation). In addition, both discretization and interpolation
introduce approximation errors that grow with the number of state variables.
The alternative method we pursue approximates the value function  () using sieves where
unknown functions are approximated by parametric basis functions (see, e.g., Chen (2007)). For
our application, this approach has several beneﬁts. First, the sieve approximation eliminates the
need to iterate on the Bellman equation to solve the value function, and therefore avoids the most
computationally intensive part of estimation. The Bellman equation is instead cast as a constraint
of the model that has to be satisﬁed at the parameter estimates. This formulation reduces the
computational burden and makes it feasible to solve for the equilibrium of models with medium to
high dimensions. In addition, the algorithm does not spend time calculating the value function in
regions of the state space not observed in the sample. The method has the potential to improve
upon methods that require calculating the value function for the entire state space, whose number
of elements is often an order of magnitude larger than a typical sample size. For example, with six
state variables (which is the number of state variables in our base speciﬁcation) and ten grids for
each, there are 106 elements in the state space. There are two main downsides of our approach: a)
ﬁnite-sample biases from the approximation and b) the non-parametric approximation converges
to the true value function at a rate slower than the square root of the sample size. JP2 documents
Monte-Carlo evidence that the method works well in our application: with a reasonable number of
basis functions, the value function approximation error is small, the bias in parameter estimates is
negligible, and the computation is very fast. We now present the estimation procedure in detail.
5.2 Sieve estimation of the value function
Recall that our Bellman equation is:






12We ran out of memory on a server with 32GB of RAM when we experimented with 20 grid points for each of the
four state variables.
18Kumar and Sloan (1987) show that if the Bellman operator is continuous and (0|) is ﬁnite,
then sieve approximation approaches the true value function arbitrarily close as the number of
sieve terms increases.13 This fact provides the theoretical foundation for using basis terms to
approximate for the value function  ()





















This equation should hold at all states observed in the data. Our approach is to choose {} to
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=1 denotes state values observed in the data, and k·k2 is the 2 norm. Essentially,
{} are solutions to a system of ﬁrst order conditions that characterize how changes in {} aﬀect
violations of the Bellman equation. There are many possible candidates for suitable basis functions
() including power series, Fourier series, splines, and neural networks. Jia and Genz (2011)
compare a group of popular basis functions using Monte-Carlo simulations. In general, the best
basis function is application speciﬁc, but well-chosen basis functions should approximate the shape
of the value function. A large number of poor basis functions can create various computational
problems and estimation issues such as large bias and variance.
Since we observe agents’ revenue directly, we exploit information embodied in the revenue
function to guide our approximation of the value function. In general, if the revenue function ¯ ()
increases in  and the transition process  also increases in , then the value function  ()
increases in 14 This property suggests the following approach: use basis functions that ﬁtt h e
revenue function ¯ () to approximate the value function in the Bellman equation. Since these
basis functions are chosen to preserve the shape of ¯ () they should also capture the shape of the
value function.
Choosing basis terms in high-dimensional models is not a simple matter; hence, we want an
adaptable procedure to economize on the number of terms to reduce numerical errors and parameter
13We thank Alan Genz for suggesting this reference.
14The formal proof of this fact follows from the Contraction Mapping Theorem and is contained in the appendix.
In our application, this observation applies since (·) increases in − and − and −
0 and −
0 increase in − and
− (i.e., the transition process increases in − and −).
19variance. We adopt the ‘Multivariate Adaptive Regression Spline’ (MARS) method popularized by
Friedman (1991) and Friedman (1993) to ﬁnd spline terms that approximate the revenue function
to a desired degree. MARS repeatedly splits the state space along each dimension, adds spline
terms that improve the ﬁtness according to some criterion function, and stops when the marginal
improvement of the ﬁt is below a threshold (10 ∗ 10−3, for example).15 Once we obtain a set of
spline basis terms {ˆ ()} that best ﬁt our revenue function ¯ (), we substitute them for {ˆ ()}
in equation (13). The estimated coeﬃcients {ˆ } are those that minimize the squared diﬀerence
between the left-hand-side and right-hand-side of the Bellman equation, where the value function
is approximated by
P
=1ˆ (()) for each point in the state space (). As in other applications
of Mathematical Programming with Equilibrium Constraints (see, e.g., Judd and Su (2008) and
Dube, Fox, and Su (2009)), we impose equation (13) as a constraint and do not explicitly solve for
{ˆ } in each iteration of the estimation procedure.
The number of spline terms  is an important component of estimation. We propose a data
driven method to determine .L e tˆ 

denote the parameter estimates when the value function
is approximated by  spline terms. We increase  until parameter estimates converge, when the




is smaller than half of its standard deviation
(which we estimate using non-parametric bootstrap simulations).
5.3 Identiﬁcation
Identiﬁcation of 1 and 2 follows from the identiﬁcation argument of a standard entry model.
Substantial exit following a moderate reduction in revenue implies a relatively large value of 1,
the coeﬃcient which measures sensitivity to revenue. On the other hand, if exit does not vary
much with reductions in revenue, then 1 is small. The coeﬃcient 2 is identiﬁed from the level of
revenue at which exits start to occur. Identiﬁcation of the spline coeﬃcients  follows from Hotz and
Miller (1993), which proved that diﬀerences in choice-speciﬁc value functions can be identiﬁed from
observed choice probabilities. In our application, the value function associated with the outside
option is set to 0. With this normalization, choice probabilities directly lead to identiﬁcation of the
value function and the spline coeﬃcients .
6E s t i m a t e s
We ﬁrst examine estimates of the revenue function and state variables’ transition process, then
present opportunity cost estimates and discuss the model’s ﬁt. Throughout this section, we bring
back the market subscript . Following Hajivassiliou (2000), we standardize all state variables
to avoid computer overﬂow errors. The aggregate state variables,      and  are
standardized with zero mean and 1 standard deviation; the skill variable  is standardized with
15We use the R package ‘earth’ (which implements MARS, written by Stephen Milborrow), together with the 
2
norm as our criterion function. We search for spline knots and spline coeﬃcients that minimize the sum of the square
of the diﬀerence between the observed revenue and the ﬁtted revenue at each data point.
20zero mean and 0.5 standard deviation. JP2 includes additional details and alternative speciﬁcations
not presented below.
6.1 Revenue function
The revenue function contains three elements: the listing share equation, the buying share equation,
and the probability that an agent’s listings are sold. De-meaning the log of the listing share (3),
we obtain:






·) + ˜ 

 (14)
where ln· = 1

P
=1 ln. The other two averages are deﬁned similarly.
We estimated equation (14) using diﬀerent control variables : gender, ﬁrm aﬃliation, the
number of years as a realtor, and an agent’s total number of transactions in the previous period,
w h i c hi su s e da sap r o x yf o rh i ss k i l l We excluded observations with 0 shares, or entrants
and second-year agents since their  is either undeﬁn e do rb i a s e dd o w n w a r d . 16 There are 32,237
agent-year observations.
The number of transactions an agent intermediates in the previous year is an important predictor
of listing shares, partly because agents with many past transactions are more likely to receive
referrals and attract new customers. When  i st h es o l er e g r e s s o r ,t h e2 of the listing-share
regression is 0.44, a high value given the extent of potential agent heterogeneity. The coeﬃcient on
 is also economically large: increasing  by one standard deviation increases agent ’s listing share
by more than sixty percent. In contrast, conditioning on past transactions, gender or aﬃliation
with the top three ﬁrms (Century 21, Coldwell Banker, and ReMax) does not improve the 2.
Experience is also an important predictor of listing shares, but it has a limited explanatory power
once  is included. Our preferred speciﬁcation is column (1) of Table 5A, which only uses  as
a regressor; alternative speciﬁcations are reported in JP2.
Given that our proxy  cannot fully capture all aspects of an agent’s skill, residuals ˜ 

 could
be positively serially correlated: a good agent consistently out-performs his peers with the same
observed value of . To investigate this issue, we regressed the residual estimate b ˜ 

 on its lags.
Interestingly, these residuals exhibit little persistence over time. The 2 of the OLS regression is
0.002, and the coeﬃcient of lagged b ˜ 

 is small and negative (about -0.04), which seems to suggest
a “mean reversion” phenomenon. We repeated the analysis with the Arellano-Bond estimator that
accommodates agent ﬁxed eﬀects. The coeﬃcient of lagged b ˜ 

 is slightly larger in the absolute
value but again with a negative sign: −015, which indicates the possibility of a “luck” component
in agents’ performance: a good year is often followed with a bad year. These results suggest
that unobserved persistent attributes, which induce a positive serial correlation, are unlikely to be
important given our controls.
16Including ﬁrst- or second-year agents only slightly reduces  coeﬃcient.










for all markets and periods. Since we cannot estimate ˜ 

 for agents with  =0 , we replace
these missing ˜ 

 with the average ˜ 

 among agents with the same experience.17 Results of the
purchasing share (5) are similar, with a slightly lower 2 of 0.3. We construct state variable ˆ 
analogously as ˆ 




1+e x p ( 
)

where  includes both aggregate state variables and agent attributes. Assuming whether listed
properties get sold are independent events conditioning on , the probability that agent  with






Pr(sell) (1 − Pr(sell))
− 
We report MLE estimates of  in column (3) of Table 5A. A linear probability model delivers
similar results. A standard deviation change in the inventory-sales ratio reduces the probability
of sales by 11-16%, while a standard deviation change in  increases the probability of sales by
3-6.5%. Market ﬁxed eﬀects are included to control for aggregate conditions in diﬀerent housing
markets that aﬀect whether a property gets sold.
Once we have estimated payoﬀ parameters  =
©
ª
 we construct our revenue function
as follows:
(;)=0 015 ∗  ∗ (Pr(sell) ∗  +0 69 ∗ )
where  denotes state variables {     whether 2005}. Note that agents
do not observe their revenue in the coming period , because  and  are determined by all
agents’ decisions simultaneously and are unknown ex ante. We calculate expected revenue by
integrating out  and  using their empirical distributions estimated in Section 6.2.
6.2 State variable’s transition
There are four stochastic aggregate state variables  and . We estimate equation (6)
with market ﬁxed eﬀects using the Arellano-Bond GMM-IV estimator to accommodate size diﬀer-
ences across markets. Market ﬁxed eﬀects in these autoregressions are incidental parameters and
cannot be consistently estimated; yet they are necessary for our second stage estimation when we
17We also experimented with replacing missing ˜ 

 with zero. Both procedures lead to very similar estimate of
.
22forecast future state variables. We compute the average residual within each market during the
ten-year sample period as our estimate of market ﬁxed eﬀects.
We add the lag of  in ’s autoregressions because a large number of listings in the previous
year is likely to generate an upward pressure on the inventory-sales ratio. Similarly, the lag of 
and  are added to  and ’s autoregressions, as both  and  are endogenous and respond to
market conditions: a growing housing market with a larger  attracts more agents, while a dete-
riorating market with a higher inventory-sales ratio leads to fewer agents. The lag of  in ’s
regressions and the lag of  and  in  and ’s autoregressions are treated as predetermined.
As shown in Table 5B, there is a sizeable level shift in the housing market before and after 2005,
and the trend-break dummies are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from each other in the regressions for 
and . On the contrary, such a level shift is not pronounced in  and ’s regressions, suggesting
that conditioning on aggregate housing market conditions, there are no structural breaks in the
amount of competition agents face in each market. Finally, the adjusted 2 is high, ranging from
0.77 to 0.96.
We estimated a variety of AR(1) models for  As in the listing share regression, agent gender
and ﬁrm aﬃliation have no impact on 2, but a diﬀerent constant term before and after 2005
produces noticeable diﬀerences. Our preferred speciﬁcation (column (5) of Table 5B) includes the
lag of skill as well as trend-break dummies.
6.3 Structural Parameters
As explained in Section 4.4, we allow the cost parameter  to diﬀer across markets. Speciﬁcally, we
choose  = {12}

=1 and  = {}

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where  denotes state variables,  is the vector of state variables for agent  in market  and
period , and the log-likelihood function (·) is deﬁn e di ne q u a t i o n( 9 ) . 18
Since we use a data dependant approach to determine the number of spline basis functions
that approximate the value function, we estimate parameters eight times, with an increasing num-
ber of spline terms ranging from 24 to 45. For each set of parameters, the standard errors are



















18To minimize potential issues with numerical computing, we use the KNITRO optimization procedure for all
estimation (including bootstrap simulations), provide analytic gradients for both the objective function and the
nonlinear constraints, experimented with diﬀerent starting values, and use 10
−6 for all tolerance levels.
19In these bootstrap estimations, we hold estimates of the revenue function and state variables’ transition process
ﬁxed, because re-estimating them in bootstrap samples requires recomputing all elements of the model and would
take too long to compute for all of the speciﬁcations we present in Section 6.
23smaller than half of their standard deviation:
 =m i n
½
˜  ∈ (18) : |ˆ 
˜ 
 − ˆ 
˜ −1









Our parameters stabilize when the number of spline terms increases to 39. Once we have ˆ  we




errors of ˆ  are calculated from the empirical sample of the bootstrap estimates. We report ˆ 
and their standard errors, the number of observations, and the number of spline terms in the ﬁrst








for  =1 8 are reported in JP2.
There is a total of 41,856 observations. All estimates have the right sign and are signiﬁcant
at the 0.01 level.20 On average, the opportunity cost is $49,000 and accounts for 80% of observed
commissions. There is a substantial variation across markets, from $30,000 for poor towns like
Revere to above $60,000 for wealthier towns such as Newton and Wellesley, which might be expected
if residents in richer towns have better outside options.
An important premise of our econometric model is that entry and exit decisions are based in
part on the future path of state variables. To examine whether or not agents consider their future
earnings, we estimate the model with discount factor  equal to zero and report ˆ  in columns (3)-
(4) of Table 6A. For a third of the markets, the estimates are negative or insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero; they average $9,850 for the remaining markets. Compared to Massachusetts’ per capita
income of $46,000 in 2006, these numbers appear to be too small and suggest that agents are
not entirely myopic. As in most empirical dynamic studies, we do not estimate  a n di n s t e a ds e t
it to  =0 90. In columns (5)-(8), we examine how results vary with diﬀerent discount factors.
Everything else equal, a smaller  =0 85 leads to a lower discounted stream of future income and
reduces the incentive to work as a broker. To oﬀset the change in , the model relies on smaller
opportunity cost estimates, which could be interpretated as diminished payoﬀ from an alternative
career. The opportunity costs vary from 85% to 90% of the original estimates in column (1) for
most markets. With a higher value of  =0 95 the average opportunity cost is about $56,300, or
15% larger than our original estimate.
In our preferred speciﬁcation, we measure an agent’s skill or ability by his past number of
transactions . One might be concerned about using the lagged outcome variable as a regressor. To
address this issue, we re-estimate our model replacing past transactions with an agent’s experience
in columns (9)-(10). These estimates are similar to those in column (1): the correlation between
these two sets of estimates is 0.89, and the average is $47,300 and $49,000, respectively. Despite the
similarity in ˆ , this alternative measure of skill delivers a much worse ﬁt of the data. The sample
log-likelihood is -14,645, compared with -12,883 using past transactions. Using this measure also
reduces the model’s ﬁt of observed commissions considerably.
There is a shift in the aggregate economy at the end of our sample, and it is possible that agents
outside options are impacted by this change. The last variation on the model allows two opportunity
20We restrict {} t ob e t w e e n- 1 5 0a n d1 5 0t op r e v e n to v e r ﬂow or underﬂow of the exponentiation.
24costs per market, ≥2005 and 2005.21 Results are reported in columns (11)-(14). All but one
parameter is signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level. Interestingly, the opportunity costs are generally higher
prior to 2005, although the diﬀerences are signiﬁcant for only a few markets. Mechanically, lower
opportunity cost estimates are driven by the fact that conditioning on observed commissions which
decreased substantially post 2005, observed exit rates were actually smaller than those prior to
2005, ceteris paribus. Results from our preferred speciﬁcation (column (1)) are in general between
ˆ 2005 and ˆ ≥2005 and are closer to ˆ 2005 on average.
Aside from speciﬁcations reported in Table 6A, we estimated a large number of alternative
models. For instance, we experimented with imposing a common  across markets, and found that
market speciﬁcv a l u e so f signiﬁcantly improved the model’s ﬁt. Restricting  to be the same
for all markets leads to an estimate of $41300. However, the ﬁt as measured by log-likelihood
is worse (-14,088 compared with -12,883 when  varies across market). In addition, the diﬀerence
between the observed and ﬁtted Pr(stay) is greater than 0.02 for more than half of the markets.
In light of large diﬀerences across cities, we also estimated our model separately for each market,
with or without variations in  over time. Finally, we experimented with diﬀerent revenue functions
that control for both agent experience and skill. Our opportunity cost estimates display consistent
patterns across all speciﬁcations we analyzed. These results lead us to conclude that the estimates
presented here are driven by entry and exit patterns observed in our data and are quite robust.
Our preferred speciﬁcation is column (1), and is the basis of the discussions below.
We report entry cost estimates in Table 6B. As mentioned in Section 4.4, the entry cost is
sensitive to the assumption on the maximum number of entrants ¯ 
.W ee x a m i n et h r e ed i ﬀerent
scenarios. The ﬁrst one assumes that ¯ 
 is equal to the largest number of entrants ever observed,
max(
), which has been used in a number of studies (see., e.g., Seim (2006).) The second one
assumes that ¯ 
 is twice the number of max(
) The third scenario recognizes that markets with
many listed houses are more likely to attract potential realtors and assumes that ¯ 
 is proportional
to the average number of listings ¯ 
 = 
25  where  = 1
 Σ
=1 We also experimented with
several other measures (2 ∗ mean(
) 
10  
20  etc.) with similar results.




 )a r e
reported for each market in all three scenarios.22 Entry costs increase mechanically with the
assumed number of potential entrants. Under the assumption ¯ 
 =m a x ( 
) the average entry
rate across all markets is 61%, leading to the lowest average entry cost estimates of $18,000 among
the three cases reported. Three markets have negative entry costs, which are necessary to justify
the high entry rates observed in these markets. The estimated entry costs in the other two scenarios
exhibit similar patterns, except that higher costs are associated with a larger value of ¯ 
.T h e
average entry cost is $79,000 assuming ¯ 
 =2∗max(
) and $26,800 assuming ¯ 
 = 
25  These
21We also estimated the model using ≥2006 and 2006 This introduces an additional state variable (a trend
break dummy at year 2006). Results are similar, but estimates of ≥2006 are less stable since our sample ends in
2007.
22We do not report the ﬁtted probability of entry, because in this simple MLE estimation (without any constraint),
the model is able to match the average entry rate exactly market by market.
25numbers might seem high given the general perception of low entry barriers of the realtor brokerage
industry. We use the most conservative estimates of entry cost in the counter-factual analysis, and
report welfare estimates both with or without incorporating entry costs.
6.4 Model’s ﬁt
We compare our model’s predictions to the observed data in two ways: information used directly
in estimation vs. information not exploited in estimation. We start with the diﬀerence between
observed revenues and our ﬁtted revenues. Given that agents’ commissions are the main driving
force of their entry/exit decisions, it is important that our model can approximate the observed
commissions.
Observed and predicted revenues may diﬀer because our model abstracts away from diﬀerences
in properties’ physical attributes and only exploits measures of the aggregate housing market.
Moreover, observed commissions are agents’ realized ex post revenue, while ﬁtted commissions
are ex ante revenue that agents expect to earn: [( ;)| −1] Any deviation in
realized competitive measure from the expected one would cause () to diﬀer from .
Given these considerations, it is encouraging to observe that the correlation coeﬃcient between
 and () is as high as 0.70. The ﬁrst two columns of Table 7 tabulate observed vs. predicted
commissions by year. The model is able to replicate both the upward and the downward trend
without year-speciﬁce ﬀects. The average observed commission is $63,300, and the average ﬁtted
expected commission is $63,900. Columns (1) and (2) in Table 8 report observed vs. predicted
commissions by market, with small diﬀerences for all markets except Arlington and Revere.23
Since agents’ exit patterns identify their opportunity costs, it is important that the model ﬁts
this pattern. Columns (3) and (4) in Table 7 and 8 document observed vs. ﬁtted probability of
staying by year and by market, respectively. We are able to match exit probabilities for all years
except 2005 when the diﬀerence is around 0.02. In particular, the model captures the U-shaped
exit probability accurately, even though the only time-series control is the trend-break dummy in
state variables’ transition matrix. On average, 12% of incumbents exit in any given year, varying
from 15% in down markets to 10% in up markets.
Exit rates exhibit bigger diﬀerences across markets and range from 16% to 8%. As reported in
columns (3) and (4) in Table 8, the model closely approximates the average exit rate for almost all
markets, and the biggest diﬀerence between the model’s prediction and the observed exit rate is
0.02. One reason for this tight relation is the market-speciﬁcc o s tp a r a m e t e r ,ˆ , though the ﬁti s
notable given the model’s nonlinear structure and complex equilibrium constraints.
To benchmark our estimate of agent’s opportunity cost ˆ , we searched for other suitable
measures that are not in our dataset. By construction, opportunity costs depend on what agents
w o u l dh a v ee a r n e di na na l t e r n a t i v ep r o f e s s i o na n da r en e v e ro b s e r v e di nr e a l i t y . W el o o k e df o r
data on earnings by professions, but are not able to obtain such information at the city level. As
23The gap is $10,000 for Arlington and $7000 for Revere. There is a big discrepancy between the observed and
predicted  and  for these two markets, which contributes to the large gaps.
26a result, we compare our estimates to each city’s 2007 median household income available from
http://www.city-data.com/. Figure 4 plots the estimated opportunity cost ˆ , from the smallest
to the largest, together with the median household income for each market in our sample. As
the opportunity cost increases from the left to the right, the median household income also rises:
in general, the foregone income is lower in poor cities and higher in rich towns. The correlation
coeﬃcient between ˆ  and the median household income is reasonably high: 0.74. There is some
variation in the gap between a realtor’s opportunity cost and a typical household income across
towns, but on average, his foregone income is slightly higher than half the median household
income. These results — high correlation coeﬃcients and comparable magnitudes — reassure about
the sensibility of the opportunity cost estimates.
7 Counterfactual analyses
7.1 Methods
In this section, we use the parameter estimates to simulate alternative market structures when
agents’ payoﬀ functions change. We ﬁrst describe how we solve for the counterfactual equilibrium,
and then present our results. All standard errors of the counterfactual analyses are calculated using
100 nonparametric bootstrap simulations.
The main issue in simulating counterfactuals involves ﬁnding the new transition process of
future  and . These two endogenous state variables are determined by all agents’ joint entry
and exit decisions. In estimating structural parameters, we obtain their transition process directly
from data; in a counterfactual, we need to ﬁnd the equilibrium transition process for 0 and 0
that is consistent with changes in the payoﬀ function.
To explain our approach, consider the thought experiment of realtors facing reduced payoﬀs
for their services. After forming a belief of the distribution of 0 and 0 b a s e do nc u r r e n ts t a t e
variables, agents individually solve the new Bellman equation and choose an optimal decision.
These decisions jointly determine the distribution of 0 and 0 Given the large number of agents
(≥100 per market) and the assumption of i.i.d private random shocks {01}, the distribution
of 0 and 0 (conditional on current state ) can be approximated by that of a normal random
variable with two parameters: the mean and the variance.
Agents beliefs are consistent when they are the same as the distribution of 0 and 0 generated
by all realtors’ optimal behavior (which in turn depends on their beliefs). In other words, the






































27where the ﬁrst and second term sums over incumbents and potential agents, respectively.24 ˜ ()
is agent ’s expected revenue in the counterfactual, 00 [ (0
)|] is the expectation of his value
function  (0
) over the distribution of future state variables (0 0, and other exogenous state
variables), and exp(
 ) is 
£
exp(
  + )
¤
 Replacing  [1{·}] with choice probabilities,
simplifying the summation over entrants who are identical ex ante (with attributes ), and omitting














where we write Pr(active;00) to emphasize that agent ’s optimal decision depends on his belief
about future competition intensity 0 and 0 Equation (15) is similar to equation (4), except that




Pr(active;00)(1 − Pr(active;00))exp(2 ∗ 
 ) (16)
The equilibrium conditions for 0 are deﬁned analogously. To summarize, computing the equilib-
rium is equivalent to searching for the mean and variance of 0 and 0 in each period for each
market.
We show in the appendix that equation (15) has a unique ﬁxed point when 0 and 0 can
be approximated as a normal random variable. Hence, an iterative approach can be employed to










we compute expected revenue ˜ ( ˆ ) (which depend on 0 and our estimate ˆ )a n ds e a r c hf o r
{}

=1 that minimizes the Bellman constraint:
{}

=1 =a r gm i n






















=1 at hand, we calculate the choice probability Pr(active) for both incumbents and
potential entrants, and update our initial guess 0 using equations (15) and (16).
In practice, solving this problem using an iterative procedure is cumbersome. We use the MPEC
24The transition process of exogenous state variables remains unchanged throughout the counterfactual exercises.
T h ed e p e n d e n c eo f on the transition process of exogenous state variables is understood and not explicitly stated
for notational simplicity.
25The right-hand-side of equation (15) monotonically decreases in (
0), so the iterative approach is guaranteed
to converge.
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 Pr(active;00)(1 − Pr(active;00))
exp(2 ∗ 
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7.2 Three counterfactuals and results
Several recent developments in the brokerage industry imply downward pressure on the current
commission rate. There has been an increasing interest in using non-traditional methods to buy
and sell properties (e.g., Levitt and Syverson (2008a)). Some home sellers list their houses on the
MLS database for a ﬂat fee (usually less than a thousand dollars) and sell properties on their own.
Others use discount brokers who oﬀer a la carte service or work on an hourly basis, often with
reduced fees. Our ﬁrst counterfactual asks the following question: if a regulator imposes a price
cap on the commission rate, what is the market structure and social cost savings at various levels
of the commission rate? We simulate the brokerage industry using ten diﬀerent commission rates,
and report results in Table 9.
The ﬁrst row of Table 9 replicates the sample, where the average annual number of agents and
entrants across all markets is 154 and 23, respectively. The average number of transactions per
agent is 7.78. A typical agent earns $63,300 per year, and sells 70% of his listings. The other rows
of the table report simulations with commission rates ranging from 2.5% to 4.75%. The standard
errors are in parentheses, most of which are reasonably tight. When the commission rate is as
low as 2.5%, the number of entrants declines 31%, the exit rate initially doubles and gradually
stabilizes, and the number of incumbents drops to 91, which is only 59% of what is observed in the
sample. Agents’ productivity increases by 73%, with a typical agent conducting 13.5 transactions
annually. All of these numbers are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the ﬁrst row. Note that a 50%
reduction in commission rate only leads to a moderate change in the revenue per agent — $54,400
vs. $63,300 — due to fewer rivals that partially oﬀsets the decline in the commission rate. This
ﬁnding is consistent with Hsieh and Moretti (2003), who documented that free entry dissipates
rents associated with housing price appreciation, leading the average agent to beneﬁtm u c hl e s s
from higher prices. As agents leave this industry, the average sales probability increases by 2%,
because remaining agents are generally more experienced and better at striking a deal.
Perhaps the most noteworthy ﬁnding of this exercise is that the magnitude of social savings is
29substantial. Savings in opportunity cost amounts to $863 million, or 22% of total commissions paid
by households during the same period. Using our most conservative estimate of entry cost, savings
in entry cost is still sizeable, about $36 million. Hsieh and Moretti (2003) compares houses sold
per agent across cities and uses a benchmark city to derive social losses from excess entry. Using
the top 10th-quantile most productive city or the bottom 25th-quantile city as a benchmark, social
loss is about 50% or 7% of brokers’ earnings, respectively. While exploiting very diﬀerent methods
and datasets, our results are broadly consistent with their ﬁnding.
The last column of Table 9 presents the reduction in commissions paid by households. These
ﬁgures do not constitute increases in social surplus, because commissions are transfers from house-
holds to realtors. To the extent that we care about the distributional eﬀect of commissions, these
beneﬁts are huge and twice larger than the welfare cost of free entry. For example, when the
commission rate is reduced by half, households would beneﬁt by about $1.94 billion.
A rough back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that reducing the commission rate by half at
the national level would decrease opportunity costs and entry costs by as much as $23 billion, while
lowering the commission payments of consumers by $50 billion. While there are many caveats with
applying our results at the national level, it is clear that policies which encourage lower commissions
could generate signiﬁcant welfare gains.
Results for other commission rates reveal a similar pattern: lower commissions lead to fewer
agents, higher productivity, and higher social savings. While our simulation rests on the assumption
that agents are not capacity constrained, we believe that this assumption is defendable for situations
considered here. For instance, agents in our study sold 80% more houses in earlier years than they
did in later years. In addition, while the membership of NAR nearly doubled from 1998 to 2006,
the number of national home sales only increased by 30%. These empirical patterns suggest that
most agents are not capacity constrained and that reducing the number of agents by 40% may not
have a major impact on the total number of properties brokered.
Under the assumption that free entry does not increase consumer surplus, supported by the
descriptive regressions presented in Section 3.2, the socially optimal commission rate is one that
minimizes agents’ idle capacity. Since our data do not contain information on the number of hours
it takes an agent to sell a property, we cannot directly measure the number of transactions an agent
could manage at full capacity. If an agent could handle 5 listings or more at the same time and a
property takes 12 weeks to sell, then a broker could conduct 20 or more transactions per year. At
that level, the optimal ﬁxed commission rate would be considerably lower than 2.5%.
The second counterfactual examines what would happen if agents were compensated by their
cost of selling a house, a possible outcome under adjustable commission rates and free entry. Unlike
housing prices that experienced signiﬁcant appreciation in the last decade, the cost of selling houses
is likely to have decreased with widespread internet use.26 Since the cost of selling houses is not
observed, we use the 1998 average commission ($18,118 per transaction) as a conservative upper
26According to Survey of California Home Buyers (C.A.R. 2008), 78% used the internet as an important part of
their home-buying process.
30bound and hold it ﬁxed for 1999-2007. This exercise could also answer the question of what would
have happened if there were no housing price appreciation throughout our sample period. Table
10 shows that if agents had been compensated at the 1998 level, there would be 24% fewer agents,
each facilitating 31% more transactions. Total commissions paid by households would be reduced
by $1.1 billion, and the social savings in opportunity costs and entry costs would reach $525 million.
So far our exercises are mainly concerned with the impact of lowering commissions. Our third
counterfactual examines the beneﬁt of providing consumers with more information. Under the
current commission structure, households cannot use the price to distinguish good agents from
mediocre ones. Many rely on referrals, which are often subjective and are sometimes diﬃcult to
obtain. In 2006, the FTC published FTC Facts for Consumers and explicitly advised consumers to
“ﬁnd out what types of properties, how many units, and where brokers have sold” to “determine how
eﬃciently they’re operating and how much experience they have” (FTC 2006). A potentially useful
policy instrument, therefore, is an experience rating program, where a government makes public
agent past performance or uses this information to certify good vs. subpar agents. Understanding
the economic forces at play in such interventions is the focus of our third counterfactual analysis.
Speciﬁcally, we simulate the model raising the skill coeﬃcient by 20% to 100%. Larger coeﬃcients
represent higher premiums to skills and lead to bigger market shares for skilled brokers, a likely
consequence when consumers can easily access information on agents’ past performance.
Table 11 shows that when the skill coeﬃcient is doubled, entry declines by 34% and the average
number of exits decreases from 18 to 15. On net, the number of active agents drops from 154 to 127,
a 17% reduction. Agent productivity is enhanced by 23%, the average sales probability increases
to 72%, and the average commission income rises from $63,300 to $77,200. This is because large
coeﬃcients diminish entry, dampen the business stealing eﬀect, and raise the skill premium for
experienced agents. There is no direct beneﬁt to consumers (except for a higher sales probability),
but savings in opportunity costs and entry costs ares t i l ls i z a b l ea t$ 3 7 2m i l l i o n . I n c r e a s i n gt h e
skill coeﬃcient by 20% to 80% generates similar beneﬁts, though of a smaller magnitude.
Relative to a price cap, this proposal has the advantage of easy implementation with all infor-
mation directly available in the Multiple Listing System. Moreover, our estimates suggest that it
may have the support of incumbent agents whose average commissions could increase substantially.
We repeated Table 9-11 using other speciﬁcations discussed in Section 6 and obtained similar
results. For example, the social saving in opportunity costs is roughly 10-12% less assuming the
discount factor  =0 85 and about 13-15% more with  =0 95 Using two cost estimates per
market, when the commission rate is reduced by half, savings in opportunity cost and entry cost
would be $880 million, compared to $899 million in Table 9.
One might be concerned that our social cost savings are mismeasured because the marginal
monetary cost of housing transactions is assumed to be zero. To address this issue, we simulated
our model twice, assuming the marginal cost is either $100 or $500 per transaction.27 Using agent
’s observed number of transactions in our MLS data, we ﬁrst backed out his ﬁxed cost ()b y
27As explained in Section 4.5, the marginal cost cannot be seperately identiﬁed from the ﬁxed cost.
31subtracting the variable cost ( )f r o mˆ :
 =ˆ  −   =ˆ  − ∗ 
where  is the marginal cost of $100 or $500 and  is the number of transactions by agent
 Then we re-computed the counter-factual analysis where agents incur both a ﬁxed cost and a
variable cost buying or selling properties.
A non-zero marginal cost introduces two countervailing forces. On the one hand, agents sell
more properties in the counterfactual and hence incur a higher variable cost. These additional
marginal costs are ignored in Table 9-11. Incorporating them leads to lower social cost savings. On
the other hand, with these costs factored in, agents’ net earning is lower. As a result, fewer agents
would remain active, which translates into higher cost savings. In our application, these two forces
largely cancel each other out. For example, with a $500 marginal cost, when the commission rate
is reduced by half, there are on average 86 active agents per market/year instead of 91 agents as
reported in Table 9. However, the total cost savings are similar: $902 million (with marginal costs)
vs. $899 million (without marginal costs).
8C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we use a new dataset to document stylized facts of entry and exit among realtors
in Greater Boston. Traditional arguments suggest that if the production process involves ﬁxed
costs, free entry could be socially ineﬃcient, although such ineﬃciencies might be outweighed by
beneﬁts to consumers if free entry brings more variety, better products, or lower prices. Among
real estate brokers, the absence of price competition between agents implies that agents compete on
non-price dimensions. Yet, increased competition is not associated with higher sales probabilities
or faster sales. While it is possible that competition among brokers improves the allocation between
houses and buyers in ways that our data do not capture, on the dimensions that we do observe, the
consumer beneﬁts from increased competition appear limited. Our dynamic structural model of
real estate agent entry and exit allows us to quantify the social costs of free entry. The method for
estimating dynamic discrete choice models may have applications in other settings with rich state
spaces.
It is important to emphasize that this paper is not against free entry. Creating additional
b a r r i e r st oe n t r ym i g h tl e a dt oa d v e r s ee ﬀects that are not captured by the model, for example, if real
estate licenses are rationed ineﬃciently. Instead, our analysis measures social costs from competition
among brokers under rigid commissions in the absence of observable beneﬁts for households. Since
most agents do not appear capacity constrained, alternative market structures with fewer agents
seem unlikely to impact the total number of properties brokered and may lead to social savings.
Our counterfactuals are intended to investigate these alternatives. Although the econometric
model we develop is stylized in certain dimensions, we are able to match key moments of the
data. Hence, the counterfactuals may be useful for measuring quantitative changes in the market
32structure. Each of the three situations we investigate — regulated price caps, commissions based on
costs, or improved information about agents’ past performance — indicate large social costs with the
current ﬁxed percentage commission regime and the potential for interventions to generate social
savings.
There are other beneﬁts associated with lower or ﬂexible commissions that are not captured
by our model or the counterfactuals. For example, lower commissions reduce transaction costs,
which might lead to a more liquid housing market, improved asset allocation, and better housing
consumption. Flexible commissions also provide a channel for consumers to choose services tailored
to their preferences. While we take the absence of price competition as given throughout this paper,
an interesting issue for future work is understanding forces that sustain this market structure.
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36A Seller’s choice model
We derive the listing share (3) using a simple sellers’ choice model. Suppose there are  home
sellers, each with a unit of property to sell. All properties are identical. A total of  agents
compete for the listing business. There are many more houses than agents:   The utility of
seller  listing with agent  at time  is assumed to have the following form:
 =
(
 +  +  =1  
0
where  is a vector of agent ’s characteristics, including demographics, past experience, ﬁrm
aﬃliation;  represents agent ’s unobserved quality; and 8 is the iid error term that captures
idiosyncratic utility seller  derives from listing with agent . If a seller is not matched with any
listing agent, he consumes his outside option with utility 0 Assuming that {}

=0 are mean





 exp( + )
B Value function monotonicity
Claim. If the revenue function ¯ () and transition process  increase in , then the value
function  () increases in .
Let  = {−−} denote our state variables, where − is the negative of 
We want to show that our value function  () is monotonically increasing in ,w h e r e :




It is straightforward to show that the operator




is a contraction mapping because  ≤  implies Γ() ≤ Γ() and Γ( + ) ≤ Γ( )+ for
0∈ (01) According to Corollary 1 on page 52 in Sokey, Lucas, and Prescott (1989), if the
contraction mapping operator satisﬁes Γ[0] ⊆ 00 where 0 is the set of bounded, continuous, and
nondecreasing functions, while 00 is the set of strictly increasing functions, then its ﬁxed point 
is strictly increasing.
In our application, () strictly increases in  and the transition matrix
0 = + 
also increases in  (0 increases in , −0 increases in − etc.). To prove that Γ[0] ⊆ 00
37we only need to show that if  () is nondecreasing in ,t h e n
R
 (0)(0|)0 is nondecreasing






 (0)(0 − )0
Let  = 0 − Using change of variables, we have:
()=
Z
 ( + )()
which is nondecreasing in  because  () is nondecreasing in ,  increases in ,a n d ≥ 0
CU n i q u e ﬁxed point of equation (15) under normality
Conditional on a given vector of state variables , if we can approximate 0 by a normal random
variable, then write
0 =  + 
where  is a mean-zero normal random variable. We will show that there is a unique  associated
with any value of 


















We ﬁrst show that the right-hand-side of this equation is monotonic in  Since expected proﬁts




 (0)(0 − )0
=
Z
 ( + )()
where we replaced 0 with  +  in the second equation. Since  ( + ) decreases in  (because
 (·) increases in −, as shown above) and   0 this completes the proof that the right-hand-
side decreases in  Hence, equation (18) has at most one ﬁxed point. At the boundary, when 
approaches 0 (so that few agents are active), Pr(active) is close to 1, so the right hand side of
equation (18) exceeds ; as  →∞ , Pr(active) → 0, the right hand side of equation (18) is smaller
than  Hence there is a unique ﬁxed point.
38D D a t as o u r c e sc i t e di nS e c t i o n1
• In 2007, two-thirds of households owned their homes, more than a quarter of national wealth
was held in residential real estate, and there were 6.4 million sales of existing homes.
— U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Oﬃce of Policy Development and
Research, “U.S. Housing Market Conditions,” 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th Quarters 2007, 1st Quar-
ter 2008. Available: http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/current/accessible/b100.htm,
B.100 Balance Sheet of Households and Nonproﬁt Organizations, from Flow of Funds
Accounts of the United States published by the Federal Reserve.
• Brokers’ commissions on the sale of real estate properties exceeded $100 billion annually
during the mid 2000s.
— Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts Table 5.4.5. Pri-
vate Fixed Investment in Structures by Type. 1929-2008.
• The recent nationwide appreciation of housing prices by 83% from 1997 to 2006 corresponded
to a substantial increase in agent entry.
— http://www.huduser.org/portal/periodicals/ushmc/spring10/hist_data.pdf, Table 10: Re-
peated Sales House Price Index: 1991-Present. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development.
• NAR membership surged from 716,000 to 1,358,000 during this period
— http://www.realtor.org/library/library/fg003, “Field Guide to NAR Membership Sta-
tistics, 1908-Present,” National Association of Realtors.
39      No. of Properties (1000)
Year   Listed   Sold   mean  std. dev  mean  std. dev
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1998 23.7 18.3 350.9 295.7 70.4 38.5 281.3
1999 22.0 18.1 385.9 320.4 61.5 35.0 342.6
2000 20.9 17.2 436.5 367.3 54.4 35.0 367.6
2001 22.6 17.6 462.8 365.5 64.5 35.8 386.3
2002 23.2 17.9 508.0 375.2 67.7 40.5 437.0
2003 25.6 19.4 513.1 362.7 77.5 39.0 476.0
2004 28.6 21.4 529.2 363.0 73.7 41.1 547.9
2005 32.5 21.1 526.1 355.6 96.8 45.5 536.3
2006 31.5 17.2 502.4 361.0 131.9 51.0 417.0
2007 27.3 13.6 489.8 364.2 126.2 52.9 359.5
All 257.9 181.9 472.1 358.5 85.4 50.0 4151.6
      Incumbent Exiting Number of
Year  Entrant Agent Agents Properties Sold mean 25th 75th mean 25th 75th
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
1998 0 3,840 0 18,256 4.75 1 6 3.76 1 5
1999 602 4,054 388 18,094 4.46 1 6 4.43 1 6
2000 462 4,013 503 17,235 4.29 1 6 4.15 1 6
2001 483 4,052 444 17,645 4.35 1 6 3.94 1 6
2002 696 4,344 404 17,872 4.11 1 5 3.91 1 6
2003 883 4,791 436 19,418 4.05 1 5 3.72 1 5
2004 1,005 5,328 468 21,432 4.02 1 5 3.70 1 5
2005 1,002 5,763 567 21,078 3.66 1 5 3.38 1 5
2006 691 5,671 783 17,198 3.03 0 4 2.75 1 4
2007 424 5,227 868 13,648 2.61 0 3 2.90 1 4










Table 2A: Real Estate Agent Listings and Sales by Year      Average Sold Incumbent Exiting Number of Num. Sold per Num. Bought per
Town Price ($1000) Entrant Agent Agents Properties Sold Listing Agent Buyer's Agent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
WELLESLEY 1051.16 239 505 280 7,459 2.93 2.73
CONCORD 925.47 67 174 91 2,581 2.68 2.46
NEWTON 746.73 215 434 195 8,779 3.94 3.93
LEXINGTON 711.98 141 268 113 4,814 3.27 3.27
HINGHAM 701.88 142 261 132 3,715 2.78 2.75
WINCHESTER 694.65 76 161 90 2,980 3.48 3.36
NEEDHAM 692.15 82 175 71 3,347 3.48 2.97
BROOKLINE 616.98 129 244 104 6,346 4.94 4.60
CAMBRIDGE 582.23 262 417 159 10,763 5.18 5.28
MARBLEHEAD 550.26 107 238 109 5,769 4.33 4.38
WATERTOWN 528.37 157 259 106 5,229 4.10 3.98
DEDHAM 516.62 110 207 103 3,689 3.55 3.12
ARLINGTON 454.32 103 196 85 5,230 4.96 4.86
WALPOLE 446.14 218 369 193 5,496 3.36 2.73
SOMERVILLE 444.83 229 303 152 4,762 3.87 3.89
READING 430.76 128 244 124 4,918 3.95 3.45
WALTHAM 405.42 146 228 108 4,823 4.58 4.10
WILMINGTON 399.37 148 250 150 3,745 3.52 2.69
PEABODY 390.43 191 317 151 5,529 3.73 3.28
STOUGHTON 386.12 272 453 235 7,234 3.48 2.99
MEDFORD 385.21 113 191 86 4,826 5.20 4.10
WAKEFIELD 381.57 243 403 208 7,919 4.19 3.84
QUINCY 379.84 472 677 321 10,757 3.68 3.59
DANVERS 357.96 97 203 110 2,771 2.89 2.59
MALDEN 347.58 404 495 215 7,136 3.70 4.10
WOBURN 347.09 109 179 103 2,918 3.80 3.16
REVERE 325.41 408 520 216 8,454 4.04 4.10
WEYMOUTH 324.14 470 652 329 9,938 3.52 3.04
SALEM 303.79 173 268 134 5,103 4.18 3.75
LYNN 299.47 470 605 286 11,048 4.37 4.18
RANDOLPH 290.57 127 192 102 3,798 4.81 3.60




prices in 2007 dollars, deflated using urban CPI.Experience N mean median mean median mean median mean median mean median
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
1 6,729 0.61 0.67 73.1 54.4 19.9 13.4 7.7 4.2 12.2 8.3
2 6,635 0.63 0.67 71.9 56.0 35.8 24.3 14.0 7.6 21.8 15.0
3 5,237 0.64 0.67 74.6 58.0 40.8 27.7 17.4 9.7 23.4 15.5
4 4,184 0.64 0.68 72.2 55.7 45.1 30.5 21.0 12.0 24.1 16.1
5 3,366 0.67 0.75 70.9 55.7 50.2 33.3 24.4 14.8 25.8 17.4
6 2,657 0.70 0.76 68.9 53.7 55.1 37.4 28.0 17.2 27.1 18.5
7 2,138 0.70 0.78 69.1 54.8 59.6 39.9 31.4 19.2 28.1 18.8
8 1,788 0.70 0.75 70.9 56.5 63.7 42.2 34.2 19.2 29.5 19.5
9+ 19,210 0.74 0.80 71.7 58.5 73.4 47.5 41.8 24.8 31.6 20.5
Skill
Entrants 7,421 0.62 0.67 71.6 53.7 20.3 13.6 8.0 4.3 12.3 8.3
<10% 3,966 0.67 0.75 73.6 55.0 24.7 17.4 10.7 6.1 13.9 9.8
10‐20% 3,966 0.67 0.75 72.8 55.0 26.8 18.4 11.8 6.8 15.0 10.0
20‐30% 3,966 0.67 0.75 74.7 55.3 28.6 20.0 13.3 7.9 15.3 10.0
30‐40% 3,966 0.68 0.75 75.1 57.0 34.4 24.5 16.1 10.1 18.3 12.7
40‐50% 3,967 0.69 0.75 72.7 55.5 39.8 30.1 19.1 12.7 20.7 15.0
50‐60% 3,966 0.70 0.75 71.2 56.0 47.0 35.6 23.4 16.5 23.6 17.3
60‐70% 3,966 0.71 0.75 71.4 57.0 59.7 47.2 30.2 22.5 29.5 22.3
70‐80% 3,966 0.71 0.75 71.2 57.8 73.5 60.0 38.0 28.6 35.5 27.5
80‐90% 3,966 0.73 0.78 68.6 58.0 97.0 79.7 52.4 41.2 44.5 35.3






Commissions Sales Days on Sales Listing
Market Probability ($1000) Commissions CommissionsAgent
Cohorts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
1998 ‐0.11** ‐0.05 ‐0.17** ‐0.25*** ‐0.07 ‐0.26*** ‐0.20*** ‐0.35*** ‐0.34*** ‐0.26***
(0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.11) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.09)
1999 ‐0.13*** ‐0.04 ‐0.07 ‐0.24** ‐0.22* ‐0.25*** ‐0.20*** ‐0.26*** ‐0.31*** ‐0.31***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.09) (0.12) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (0.10)
2000 ‐0.21*** ‐0.17*** ‐0.16** ‐0.22** ‐0.38*** ‐0.30*** ‐0.31*** ‐0.34*** ‐0.31*** ‐0.29***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.09) (0.11) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.09) (0.11)
2001 ‐0.36*** ‐0.24*** ‐0.40*** ‐0.26** ‐0.45*** ‐0.39*** ‐0.32*** ‐0.49*** ‐0.34*** ‐0.30**
(0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (0.11) (0.14) (0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (0.10) (0.13)
2002 ‐0.42*** ‐0.40*** ‐0.47*** ‐0.49*** ‐0.31* ‐0.41*** ‐0.46*** ‐0.54*** ‐0.45*** ‐0.16
(0.07) (0.09) (0.11) (0.13) (0.16) (0.06) (0.09) (0.11) (0.13) (0.15)
2003 ‐0.50*** ‐0.47*** ‐0.61*** ‐0.73*** ‐0.52** ‐0.49*** ‐0.52*** ‐0.66*** ‐0.70*** ‐0.47**
(0.09) (0.11) (0.13) (0.17) (0.23) (0.09) (0.12) (0.15) (0.18) (0.21)
2004 ‐0.67*** ‐0.50*** ‐0.75*** ‐1.01*** ‐0.30 ‐0.73*** ‐0.70*** ‐0.90*** ‐1.03*** ‐0.15
(0.13) (0.17) (0.19) (0.24) (0.33) (0.14) (0.19) (0.22) (0.26) (0.33)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Log(Nmt) ‐0.096*** ‐0.061** ‐0.048 ‐0.073 0.182*** 0.014***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.07) (0.07) (0.03) (0.00)
Log(Nmt) Before 2005 ‐0.043* ‐0.059 0.015***
(0.03) (0.08) (0.00)
Log(Nmt) After 2005 ‐0.066** ‐0.082 0.013***
(0.03) (0.07) (0.00)
List price control N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y
R2 0.0888 0.0979 0.0979 0.1169 0.1173 0.1173 0.8569 0.9933 0.9933






































Estimation Method OLS OLS MLE
Market Fixed Effects No No Yes
N 32237 30986 32237
R
2 adjusted 0.44 0.30 0.18
HP Inv L B Skill
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
lag_HP 0.74*** 0.21*** 0.35*** 0.35***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02)








L05 0.29*** ‐0.10** 0.03* 0.04** 0.04**
(0.03) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00)
Ge05 0.17*** 0.62*** 0.12*** 0.09*** 0.00
(0.05) (0.07) (0.03) (0.03) (0.00)
Estimation Method GMM‐IV GMM‐IV GMM‐IV GMM‐IV OLS
Market Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No
N 279 279 279 279 30648
R











excluded in Table 5A and column (5) of Table 5B.C std(C) C std(C) C std(C) C std(C) C std(C) Ct<2005 std(Ct<2005) Ct≥2005 std(Ct≥2005)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
ARLINGTON 0.42*** (0.05) 0.07*** (0.02) 0.37*** (0.05) 0.49*** (0.06) 0.53*** (0.01) 0.44*** (0.07) 0.37*** (0.08)
BROOKLINE 0.65*** (0.01) 0.21*** (0.02) 0.59*** (0.01) 0.71*** (0.01) 0.74*** (0.01) 0.66*** (0.04) 0.64*** (0.06)
CAMBRIDGE 0.69*** (0.02) 0.19*** (0.02) 0.61*** (0.02) 0.77*** (0.02) 0.74*** (0.02) 0.83*** (0.02) 0.40*** (0.05)
CONCORD 0.83*** (0.01) 0.24*** (0.02) 0.75*** (0.01) 0.95*** (0.02) 0.68*** (0.01) 0.77*** (0.04) 0.94*** (0.06)
DANVERS 0.31*** (0.05) ‐0.05*** (0.02) 0.25*** (0.05) 0.40*** (0.05) 0.28*** (0.01) 0.30*** (0.06) 0.21** (0.08)
DEDHAM 0.46*** (0.05) 0.08*** (0.02) 0.40*** (0.04) 0.54*** (0.05) 0.44*** (0.02) 0.41*** (0.06) 0.43*** (0.07)
HINGHAM 0.56*** (0.01) 0.13*** (0.02) 0.50*** (0.01) 0.62*** (0.01) 0.49*** (0.01) 0.54*** (0.04) 0.58*** (0.06)
LEXINGTON 0.60*** (0.01) 0.13*** (0.02) 0.53*** (0.01) 0.69*** (0.01) 0.58*** (0.01) 0.61*** (0.04) 0.61*** (0.05)
LYNN 0.38*** (0.03) 0.01 (0.01) 0.33*** (0.02) 0.43*** (0.03) 0.32*** (0.01) 0.34*** (0.04) 0.47*** (0.03)
MALDEN 0.40*** (0.02) 0.02* (0.01) 0.35*** (0.02) 0.47*** (0.03) 0.35*** (0.01) 0.49*** (0.04) 0.37*** (0.04)
MARBLEHEAD 0.44*** (0.05) 0.10*** (0.02) 0.40*** (0.05) 0.50*** (0.06) 0.59*** (0.02) 0.44*** (0.06) 0.45*** (0.08)
MEDFORD 0.49*** (0.05) 0.06*** (0.02) 0.42*** (0.05) 0.58*** (0.06) 0.49*** (0.02) 0.39*** (0.08) 0.51*** (0.07)
NEEDHAM 0.63*** (0.01) 0.14*** (0.02) 0.56*** (0.01) 0.72*** (0.01) 0.57*** (0.01) 0.71*** (0.04) 0.52*** (0.07)
NEWTON 0.62*** (0.02) 0.23*** (0.01) 0.59*** (0.02) 0.64*** (0.03) 0.74*** (0.01) 0.70*** (0.05) 0.56*** (0.03)
PEABODY 0.37*** (0.04) 0.01 (0.02) 0.32*** (0.03) 0.44*** (0.04) 0.36*** (0.01) 0.38*** (0.05) 0.34*** (0.06)
QUINCY 0.32*** (0.03) 0.01 (0.01) 0.28*** (0.02) 0.36*** (0.03) 0.33*** (0.01) 0.42*** (0.03) 0.31*** (0.03)
RANDOLPH 0.47*** (0.06) 0.01 (0.02) 0.40*** (0.05) 0.57*** (0.06) 0.36*** (0.02) 0.42*** (0.07) 0.43*** (0.07)
READING 0.41*** (0.04) 0.03** (0.02) 0.35*** (0.04) 0.49*** (0.05) 0.40*** (0.01) 0.34*** (0.06) 0.43*** (0.07)
REVERE 0.30*** (0.03) 0.03** (0.01) 0.27*** (0.03) 0.34*** (0.03) 0.37*** (0.01) 0.52*** (0.04) 0.34*** (0.04)
SALEM 0.37*** (0.04) ‐0.03 (0.02) 0.30*** (0.04) 0.45*** (0.05) 0.30*** (0.01) 0.35*** (0.06) 0.36*** (0.06)
SOMERVILLE 0.59*** (0.05) 0.11*** (0.02) 0.51*** (0.04) 0.67*** (0.05) 0.47*** (0.01) 0.50*** (0.08) 0.61*** (0.06)
STOUGHTON 0.37*** (0.04) 0.00 (0.01) 0.31*** (0.03) 0.44*** (0.04) 0.32*** (0.01) 0.37*** (0.03) 0.31*** (0.05)
WAKEFIELD 0.44*** (0.03) 0.03** (0.01) 0.38*** (0.03) 0.52*** (0.04) 0.36*** (0.01) 0.45*** (0.04) 0.36*** (0.05)
WALPOLE 0.42*** (0.03) 0.03** (0.01) 0.36*** (0.03) 0.50*** (0.03) 0.39*** (0.01) 0.39*** (0.04) 0.39*** (0.06)
WALTHAM 0.44*** (0.05) 0.05*** (0.02) 0.37*** (0.04) 0.51*** (0.05) 0.43*** (0.01) 0.44*** (0.07) 0.41*** (0.07)
WATERTOWN 0.50*** (0.01) 0.10*** (0.02) 0.45*** (0.01) 0.57*** (0.01) 0.55*** (0.01) 0.53*** (0.04) 0.48*** (0.06)
WELLESLEY 0.87*** (0.01) 0.36*** (0.01) 0.81*** (0.01) 0.92*** (0.01) 0.79*** (0.01) 0.92*** (0.02) 0.79*** (0.05)
WEYMOUTH 0.34*** (0.03) ‐0.03*** (0.01) 0.29*** (0.03) 0.41*** (0.03) 0.27*** (0.01) 0.35*** (0.03) 0.29*** (0.04)
WILMINGTON 0.41*** (0.05) 0.04*** (0.02) 0.35*** (0.05) 0.48*** (0.06) 0.41*** (0.01) 0.47*** (0.05) 0.35*** (0.08)
WINCHESTER 0.69*** (0.01) 0.20*** (0.02) 0.62*** (0.01) 0.78*** (0.01) 0.68*** (0.01) 0.61*** (0.04) 0.82*** (0.05)
WOBURN 0.38*** (0.07) 0.03 (0.02) 0.32*** (0.06) 0.46*** (0.08) 0.34*** (0.03) 0.45*** (0.08) 0.38*** (0.07)
Log‐Likelihood ‐12883 ‐12819 ‐12892 ‐12875 ‐14645 ‐12779
Number of 
Observations 41856 41856 41856 41856 41856 41856
Number of 





δ=0.85 δ=0.95 Years of Experience δ=0 δ=0.90 (Main Specification)Market Ƙ std(Ƙ) Prob. Entry Ƙ std(Ƙ) Prob. Entry Ƙ std(Ƙ) Prob. Entry
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
ARLINGTON 0.44*** (0.03) 0.50 0.95*** (0.03) 0.25 0.54*** (0.03) 0.44
BROOKLINE 0.04 (0.04) 0.65 0.69*** (0.03) 0.33 0.47*** (0.03) 0.43
CAMBRIDGE 0.17*** (0.01) 0.55 0.81*** (0.01) 0.27 0.31*** (0.01) 0.48
CONCORD 0.21*** (0.06) 0.53 0.75*** (0.06) 0.27 0.21*** (0.06) 0.53
DANVERS 0.28*** (0.04) 0.60 0.87*** (0.04) 0.30 0.28*** (0.04) 0.60
DEDHAM 0.34*** (0.03) 0.53 0.88*** (0.03) 0.27 0.34*** (0.03) 0.53
HINGHAM 0.24*** (0.03) 0.63 0.86*** (0.03) 0.32 0.24*** (0.03) 0.63
LEXINGTON 0.04 (0.04) 0.75 0.70*** (0.05) 0.37 0.23*** (0.04) 0.62
LYNN 0.06*** (0.01) 0.67 0.72*** (0.01) 0.33 0.06*** (0.01) 0.67
MALDEN 0.34*** (0.01) 0.52 0.88*** (0.01) 0.26 0.34*** (0.01) 0.52
MARBLEHEAD 0.21*** (0.04) 0.63 0.83*** (0.04) 0.31 0.70*** (0.04) 0.38
MEDFORD 0.30*** (0.03) 0.52 0.83*** (0.03) 0.26 0.39*** (0.03) 0.47
NEEDHAM 0.21*** (0.04) 0.61 0.81*** (0.04) 0.30 0.36*** (0.04) 0.53
NEWTON 0.02 (0.02) 0.66 0.67*** (0.02) 0.33 0.33*** (0.02) 0.50
PEABODY 0.24*** (0.02) 0.61 0.84*** (0.02) 0.30 0.24*** (0.02) 0.61
QUINCY 0.38*** (0.01) 0.55 0.93*** (0.01) 0.27 0.38*** (0.01) 0.55
RANDOLPH 0.29*** (0.02) 0.50 0.81*** (0.03) 0.25 0.29*** (0.02) 0.50
READING 0.07* (0.04) 0.68 0.74*** (0.05) 0.34 0.30*** (0.04) 0.57
REVERE 0.42*** (0.01) 0.53 0.96*** (0.01) 0.27 0.42*** (0.01) 0.53
SALEM 0.42*** (0.02) 0.49 0.93*** (0.02) 0.25 0.42*** (0.02) 0.49
SOMERVILLE 0.07*** (0.02) 0.61 0.66*** (0.02) 0.30 0.07*** (0.02) 0.61
STOUGHTON 0.15*** (0.02) 0.64 0.78*** (0.02) 0.32 0.15*** (0.02) 0.64
WAKEFIELD 0.09*** (0.02) 0.64 0.72*** (0.02) 0.32 0.09*** (0.02) 0.64
WALPOLE 0.03 (0.03) 0.69 0.71*** (0.03) 0.35 0.03 (0.03) 0.69
WALTHAM 0.25*** (0.02) 0.58 0.82*** (0.02) 0.29 0.25*** (0.02) 0.58
WATERTOWN 0.18*** (0.02) 0.65 0.82*** (0.02) 0.32 0.26*** (0.02) 0.61
WELLESLEY ‐0.17*** (0.02) 0.72 0.57*** (0.02) 0.36 ‐0.06*** (0.02) 0.67
WEYMOUTH ‐0.05*** (0.01) 0.74 0.69*** (0.01) 0.37 ‐0.05*** (0.01) 0.74
WILMINGTON 0.22*** (0.03) 0.61 0.82*** (0.03) 0.30 0.22*** (0.03) 0.61
WINCHESTER ‐0.14** (0.06) 0.70 0.56*** (0.06) 0.35 0.19*** (0.06) 0.54







observed entrants for columns 4‐6, and the average num. of listings divided by 25 for columns 7‐9. Entry costs in $100,000 2007 dollars.Observed Fit Observed Fit
1999 0.60 0.58 0.90 0.90
2000 0.63 0.59 0.88 0.89
2001 0.66 0.67 0.89 0.89
2002 0.72 0.73 0.90 0.90
2003 0.73 0.74 0.90 0.90
2004 0.75 0.76 0.90 0.89
2005 0.67 0.71 0.89 0.87
2006 0.51 0.56 0.86 0.87
2007 0.46 0.46 0.85 0.86
All 0.63 0.64 0.88 0.88
Observed Fit Observed Fit
ARLINGTON 0.79 0.71 0.91 0.91
BROOKLINE 1.07 1.04 0.91 0.91
CAMBRIDGE 1.05 1.11 0.91 0.89
CONCORD 0.78 0.81 0.90 0.90
DANVERS 0.32 0.34 0.87 0.87
DEDHAM 0.60 0.62 0.89 0.88
HINGHAM 0.61 0.65 0.89 0.89
LEXINGTON 0.78 0.77 0.91 0.92
LYNN 0.47 0.48 0.87 0.88
MALDEN 0.50 0.52 0.87 0.88
MARBLEHEAD 0.76 0.79 0.91 0.91
MEDFORD 0.64 0.67 0.90 0.89
NEEDHAM 0.76 0.77 0.92 0.92
NEWTON 0.96 0.99 0.90 0.90
PEABODY 0.47 0.50 0.89 0.88
QUINCY 0.49 0.48 0.88 0.88
RANDOLPH 0.44 0.46 0.85 0.85
READING 0.54 0.55 0.89 0.89
REVERE 0.48 0.58 0.88 0.90
SALEM 0.45 0.43 0.88 0.88
SOMERVILLE 0.62 0.65 0.86 0.86
STOUGHTON 0.44 0.43 0.87 0.87
WAKEFIELD 0.53 0.51 0.88 0.88
WALPOLE 0.49 0.48 0.87 0.86
WALTHAM 0.65 0.59 0.88 0.89
WATERTOWN 0.73 0.73 0.91 0.91
WELLESLEY 1.03 0.99 0.88 0.88
WEYMOUTH 0.39 0.38 0.87 0.86
WILMINGTON 0.43 0.43 0.84 0.86
WINCHESTER 0.76 0.80 0.89 0.89





Commissions Probability of StayAve. Number Ave. Number Ave. Number Ave. Number Avg. Avg. Sales oppCst Entry Cost Commission
Transactions of Entrants of Active Agents of Exiting Agents Commission Probability Savings ($mil) Savings ($mil) Savings ($mil)
Actual (5%) 7.78 22.52 153.78 18.05 0.63 0.70
Counterfactual
    4.75% 8.13 21.70 147.18 18.23 0.63 0.70 90.37 4.25 193.52
(0.15) (0.22) (2.37) (0.58) (0.00) (0.00) (3.75) (0.51)
    4.50% 8.50 20.93 140.81 18.40 0.62 0.71 177.25 8.26 387.03
(0.16) (0.22) (2.35) (0.57) (0.00) (0.00) (4.05) (0.68)
    4.25% 8.91 20.17 134.47 18.57 0.62 0.71 263.90 12.16 580.55
(0.18) (0.23) (2.32) (0.56) (0.00) (0.00) (4.40) (0.87)
    4.00% 9.36 19.44 128.15 18.75 0.61 0.71 350.31 15.95 774.06
(0.19) (0.23) (2.29) (0.55) (0.00) (0.00) (4.79) (1.05)
    3.75% 9.86 18.72 121.85 18.93 0.60 0.71 436.47 19.63 967.58
(0.21) (0.24) (2.26) (0.53) (0.00) (0.00) (5.20) (1.24)
    3.50% 10.42 18.03 115.57 19.11 0.59 0.71 522.36 23.20 1161.09
(0.23) (0.24) (2.22) (0.52) (0.00) (0.00) (5.62) (1.42)
    3.25% 11.04 17.35 109.32 19.29 0.58 0.71 607.95 26.66 1354.61
(0.26) (0.24) (2.18) (0.50) (0.00) (0.00) (6.04) (1.59)
    3.00% 11.74 16.70 103.09 19.47 0.57 0.71 693.23 30.01 1548.12
(0.28) (0.24) (2.14) (0.48) (0.00) (0.00) (6.47) (1.77)
    2.75% 12.54 16.06 96.89 19.66 0.56 0.72 778.19 33.25 1741.64
(0.31) (0.24) (2.09) (0.47) (0.00) (0.00) (6.88) (1.93)
    2.50% 13.46 15.45 90.70 19.84 0.54 0.72 862.82 36.39 1935.15
(0.35) (0.24) (2.03) (0.45) (0.00) (0.00) (7.27) (2.10)
Table 9: Market Structure with Different Commission Rates
Note: average commissions are in $100,000 2007 dollars. In each of the counterfactual simulations, we reduce the commission rate to the denoted fraction of the original commission 
rate. Standard errors (in brackets) are derived from 100 bootstrap simulations.Ave. Number Ave. Number Ave. Number Ave. Number Avg. Avg. Sales oppCst Entry Cost Commission
Transactions of Entrants of Active Agents of Exiting Agents Commission Probability Savings ($mil) Savings ($mil) Savings ($mil)
Actual 7.78 22.52 153.78 18.05 0.63 0.70
Counterfactual
    No Price Appreciation 10.20 17.99 116.93 19.12 0.60 0.71 502 23 1105.06
(0.22) (0.24) (2.23) (0.52) (0.00) (0.00) (5.50) (1.42)
Note: average commissions are in $100,000 2007 dollars. Standard errors (in brackets) are derived from 100 bootstrap simulations.
Ave. Number Ave. Number Ave. Number Ave. Number Avg. Avg. Sales oppCst Entry Cost
Transactions of Entrants of Active Agents of Exiting Agents Commission Probability Savings ($mil) Savings ($mil)
Actual 7.78 22.52 153.78 18.05 0.63 0.703
Counterfactual
    Raise Skill Coef by 20% 8.09 20.83 148.33 17.17 0.66 0.71 62.80 8.90
(0.14) (0.19) (2.33) (0.54) (0.00) (0.00) (3.93) (0.64)
    Raise Skill Coef by 40% 8.43 19.16 142.56 16.41 0.69 0.71 134.32 17.74
(0.16) (0.18) (2.29) (0.51) (0.00) (0.00) (4.52) (1.02)
    Raise Skill Coef by 60% 8.76 17.69 137.60 15.74 0.72 0.71 193.71 25.57
(0.17) (0.17) (2.28) (0.48) (0.00) (0.00) (5.08) (1.38)
    Raise Skill Coef by 80% 9.15 16.26 132.22 15.19 0.75 0.71 269.94 32.94
(0.19) (0.17) (2.28) (0.46) (0.00) (0.00) (5.63) (1.77)
    Double Skill Coef 9.53 14.95 127.48 14.68 0.77 0.72 332.76 39.63







   
        
        
        
        
         
         
                                                     
                                           





    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
  
                                                     
                                           
                                                               
                    
    
         
         
         
         
          
          
          






































































































































































































































































                                  
                                                                    